ai.dinglebear/rgotify

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  warn25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  install hook "postinstall" present and not a recognized benign build command

• Credential hygiene

  pass15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. scripts/install.js) — the recommended intake shape. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

• Permission scope

  warn15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  has both shell/exec and network egress — capable of download-and-run, though no such path was observed (scripts/check-package.js: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn; scripts/check-package.js: outbound HTTP/socket call). has both shell/exec and destructive filesystem writes (scripts/check-package.js: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn; scripts/check-package.js: destructive/writing fs.* call (write/unlink/rm/chmod/rename)). discloses shell/exec capability: scripts/check-package.js: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn discloses shell/exec capability: scripts/install.js: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn discloses shell/exec capability: bin/rgotify.js: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: scripts/check-package.js: destructive/writing fs.* call (write/unlink/rm/chmod/rename) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: scripts/install.js: destructive/writing fs.* call (write/unlink/rm/chmod/rename) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: scripts/sync-readme.js: destructive/writing fs.* call (write/unlink/rm/chmod/rename) Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  fail10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  vs prior 0.1.2 (minor bump): new capability primitive(s) in source: child_process, fs-write, http-client; new hardcoded outbound host/BCC destination(s): console.cloud.google.com, dinglebear.ai, github.com, gotify.example.com, rgotify.dinglebear.ai.

• Transport config

  unscannable10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  local stdio server: no remote transport or auth surface, and no phone-home/telemetry signal found in source. Absence of transport findings is NOT a safety guarantee — phone-home hosts can be constructed at runtime and defeat static analysis.