ai.nauro/nauro

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  pass25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  Python build script has no build-time network/exec; repository linkage verified

• Credential hygiene

  pass15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. src/nauro/cli/commands/hook.py) — the recommended intake shape. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

• Permission scope

  warn15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  references credential paths: src/nauro/cli/git_hygiene.py: references a credential path (/mcp.json) references credential paths: src/nauro/cli/commands/adopt.py: references a credential path (/mcp.json) references credential paths: src/nauro/cli/integrations/json_mcp.py: references a credential path (/mcp.json) has both shell/exec and network egress — capable of download-and-run, though no such path was observed (src/nauro/cli/git_hygiene.py: subprocess.* call; src/nauro/cli/commands/auth.py: outbound HTTP/socket call). has both shell/exec and destructive filesystem writes (src/nauro/cli/git_hygiene.py: subprocess.* call; src/nauro/cli/commands/adopt.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.)). discloses shell/exec capability: 4 files (src/nauro/cli/git_hygiene.py, src/nauro/cli/nauro_command.py, src/nauro/cli/commands/adopt.py, +1 more) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: 6 files (src/nauro/cli/commands/adopt.py, src/nauro/store/_atomic.py, src/nauro/store/recovery.py, +3 more) Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  fail10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  vs prior 1.18.1 (minor bump): new capability primitive(s) in source: fs-write, http-client, subprocess; new hardcoded outbound host/BCC destination(s): cursor.com, developers.openai.com, github.com, mcp.nauro.ai, nauro.ai.

• Transport config

  warn10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  manifest/source references telemetry behavior — disclosure