ai.nauro/nauro

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  pass25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  Python build script has no build-time network/exec; repository linkage verified

• Credential hygiene

  pass15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. src/nauro/cli/commands/hook.py) — the recommended intake shape. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

• Permission scope

  fail15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  HIGH: src/nauro/cli/commands/setup.py: references a sensitive credential path (/.cursor/) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: shell/exec capability AND network egress together — download-and-execute risk (src/nauro/cli/commands/adopt.py: subprocess.* call; src/nauro/cli/commands/auth.py: outbound HTTP/socket call). HIGH: shell/exec capability AND destructive filesystem writes together (src/nauro/cli/commands/adopt.py: subprocess.* call; src/nauro/cli/commands/auth.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access). discloses shell/exec capability: src/nauro/cli/commands/adopt.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/nauro/sync/merge.py: subprocess.* call discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/nauro/cli/commands/auth.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/nauro/store/_atomic.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/nauro/store/registry.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  pass10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  tool surface, capabilities, install scripts, and publisher unchanged vs prior version 1.6.0 (minor bump); no rug-pull drift.

• Transport config

  warn10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  sends telemetry to third-party SDK (PostHog) — disclosure, verify opt-in; manifest/source references Telemetry behavior — disclosure