MCP server · trust report

ai.openmandate/mcp

1 check that ran failed — transport config — so this release can’t be trusted as-is.

Publisher
ai.openmandate
Repository
Install
remote only
Versions
7
MCP revision
2025-03-26 · superseded
Inspected
5 of 6 checks · 85%
Scored
2026-09-03 · rubric 1.0.0

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

6 checks2 clean3 flagged1 not inspected
  • Injection surface

    warn25% of grade

    Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

    tool "openmandate_create_mandate" description: off-vendor URL in a description (openmandate.ai); capability text should not name where data goes. tool "openmandate_submit_answers" description: bare 'IMPORTANT:' prose in a description (tag form is high-confidence; prose is warn). tool "openmandate_submit_outcome" description: bare 'IMPORTANT:' prose in a description (tag form is high-confidence; prose is warn). server instructions: off-vendor URL in a description (openmandate.ai); capability text should not name where data goes.

  • Supply chain

    warn25% of grade

    Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

    no resolvable repository linked to the package (provenance unverifiable)

  • Credential hygiene

    pass15% of grade

    How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

    No hardcoded secrets, secret-shaped tool parameters, or leaked keys found. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

  • Permission scope

    unscannable15% of grade

    Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

    No source files, package.json, or pyproject were fetched; cannot infer capability scope.

  • Version behavior

    pass10% of grade

    Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

    tool surface, capabilities, install scripts, and publisher unchanged vs prior version 0.6.0 (patch bump); no rug-pull drift.

  • Transport config

    fail10% of grade

    Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

    remote MCP endpoint declares NO authentication (unauthenticated remote — nginx-ui/CVE-2026-33032 class)

Version history

Each release plotted by grade against the safe line at B. A version that sinks below the line has lost its trusted standing — the shape of a rug-pull.

VersionPublishedGradeScoreInspectedChange
v0.6.1 · current2026-09-02 C655/6 · 85%B→C in v0.6.1
v0.6.02026-04-15 B754/6 · 75%insf→B in v0.6.0
v0.3.32026-03-07 insufficient1/6 · 25%±0
v0.3.12026-03-06 insufficient1/6 · 25%