ai.timix/time-tracking

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  fail25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  tool "write_off_time" param "time_report_id" description: names an outbound copy/exfil destination (BCC/exfil verb). tool "update_scheduled_report" param "id" description: names an outbound copy/exfil destination (BCC/exfil verb). tool "cancel_scheduled_report" param "id" description: names an outbound copy/exfil destination (BCC/exfil verb).

• Supply chain

  warn25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  no resolvable repository linked to the package (provenance unverifiable)

• Credential hygiene

  fail15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  tool "close_month" has a secret-shaped input parameter "confirm_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "issue_invoice" has a secret-shaped input parameter "confirm_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "void_invoice" has a secret-shaped input parameter "confirm_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "reissue_invoice" has a secret-shaped input parameter "confirm_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "reopen_month" has a secret-shaped input parameter "confirm_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "permanent_delete_entity" has a secret-shaped input parameter "confirm_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "change_user_role" has a secret-shaped input parameter "confirm_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "remove_user" has a secret-shaped input parameter "confirm_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "delete_api_key" has a secret-shaped input parameter "confirm_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "delete_organization" has a secret-shaped input parameter "confirm_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential).

• Permission scope

  unscannable15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  No source files, package.json, or pyproject were fetched; cannot infer capability scope.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of ai.timix/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  pass10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  remote endpoint "https://api.timix.ai/api/integration/v1/mcp" uses TLS (https); remote endpoint uses OAuth (strongest auth mode)