ai.trydock/dock

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  fail25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  tool "send_message" description: 'sidenote'/'side-channel' exfiltration param (Invariant PoC). tool "update_doc" description: off-vendor URL in a description (…); capability text should not name where data goes. tool "update_doc" description: off-vendor URL in a description (cdn.dock.ai); capability text should not name where data goes. tool "share_file" description: off-vendor URL in a description (trydock.ai); capability text should not name where data goes.

• Supply chain

  warn25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  package name "@trydock/mcp" is edit-distance 2 from popular package "yup" (typosquat candidate)

• Credential hygiene

  fail15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  tool "remove_workspace_member" has a secret-shaped input parameter "confirm_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "upgrade_plan" has a secret-shaped input parameter "confirm_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "downgrade_plan" has a secret-shaped input parameter "confirm_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "revoke_file_share" has a secret-shaped input parameter "token_id" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential).

• Permission scope

  pass15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  No shell-exec, unbounded/sensitive filesystem, or download-and-run primitives found in scanned source. PASS = no static red flag. Static scanning is blind to code fetched or executed at runtime.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of ai.trydock/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  fail10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  remote MCP endpoint declares NO authentication (unauthenticated remote — nginx-ui/CVE-2026-33032 class)