ai.weftly/weftly

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  warn25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  tool "clips_vertical" description: cross-tool redirection ('instead of call…').

• Supply chain

  pass25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  repository linkage verified

• Credential hygiene

  fail15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  tool "transcribe" has a secret-shaped input parameter "payment_credential" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "summarize" has a secret-shaped input parameter "payment_credential" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "find_clips" has a secret-shaped input parameter "payment_credential" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "extract_clip" has a secret-shaped input parameter "payment_credential" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "extract_vertical_clip" has a secret-shaped input parameter "payment_credential" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "clips_vertical" has a secret-shaped input parameter "payment_credential" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "clips_horizontal" has a secret-shaped input parameter "payment_credential" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "mpp_smoke_test" has a secret-shaped input parameter "payment_credential" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "publish_to_youtube" has a secret-shaped input parameter "session_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "publish_to_youtube" has a secret-shaped input parameter "access_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "publish_to_youtube" has a secret-shaped input parameter "refresh_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "trigger_youtube_publish" has a secret-shaped input parameter "session_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_youtube_publish_status" has a secret-shaped input parameter "session_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential).

• Permission scope

  unscannable15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  No source files, package.json, or pyproject were fetched; cannot infer capability scope.

• Version behavior

  pass10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  tool surface, capabilities, install scripts, and publisher unchanged vs prior version 0.30.8 (patch bump); no rug-pull drift.

• Transport config

  fail10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  remote MCP endpoint declares NO authentication (unauthenticated remote — nginx-ui/CVE-2026-33032 class)