app.aiconduit/conduit

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  warn25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  server instructions: off-vendor URL in a description (aiconduit.app); capability text should not name where data goes.

• Supply chain

  pass25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  repository linkage verified

• Credential hygiene

  fail15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  tool "agent_update" has a secret-shaped input parameter "session_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "agent_organization" has a secret-shaped input parameter "session_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "agent_notify" has a secret-shaped input parameter "session_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "agent_outreach" has a secret-shaped input parameter "session_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "agent_report_issue" has a secret-shaped input parameter "session_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "payment_methods" has a secret-shaped input parameter "session_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "payment_mandate" has a secret-shaped input parameter "session_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "supply_search" has a secret-shaped input parameter "session_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "supply_details" has a secret-shaped input parameter "session_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "supply_delivery" has a secret-shaped input parameter "session_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "order_execute" has a secret-shaped input parameter "session_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "order_list" has a secret-shaped input parameter "session_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "order_track" has a secret-shaped input parameter "session_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "order_events" has a secret-shaped input parameter "session_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "order_update_status" has a secret-shaped input parameter "session_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "order_dispute" has a secret-shaped input parameter "session_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "order_feedback" has a secret-shaped input parameter "session_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential).

• Permission scope

  unscannable15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  No source files, package.json, or pyproject were fetched; cannot infer capability scope.

• Version behavior

  pass10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  vs prior 0.1.0 (major bump): tool "payment_mandate" description changed (wording only, no injection pattern); tool "supply_details" description changed (wording only, no injection pattern); tool "supply_delivery" description changed (wording only, no injection pattern); tool "order_execute" description changed (wording only, no injection pattern); tool "order_execute" gained input property(ies): payment_term_id. Low-severity drift (informational; consistent with the version bump).

• Transport config

  fail10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  remote MCP endpoint declares NO authentication (unauthenticated remote — nginx-ui/CVE-2026-33032 class)