MCP server · trust report

ch.opencaselaw/swiss-caselaw

3 checks that ran failed — injection surface, version behavior and transport config — so this release can’t be trusted as-is.

Publisher
ch.opencaselaw
Repository
github.com/jonashertner/caselaw-repo-1
Install
remote only
Versions
2
MCP revision
2025-11-25 · superseded
Inspected
6 of 6 checks · 100%
Scored
2026-09-04 · rubric 1.0.0

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

6 checks3 clean3 flagged
  • Injection surface

    fail25% of grade

    Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

    server instructions: instruction to hide activity from the user. tool "draft_mock_decision" description: bare 'IMPORTANT:' prose in a description (tag form is high-confidence; prose is warn). server instructions: bare 'IMPORTANT:' prose in a description (tag form is high-confidence; prose is warn). server instructions: off-vendor URL in a description (mcp.opencaselaw.ch); capability text should not name where data goes. server instructions: off-vendor URL in a description (opencaselaw.ch); capability text should not name where data goes.

  • Supply chain

    pass25% of grade

    Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

    Python build script has no build-time network/exec; repository linkage verified

  • Credential hygiene

    pass15% of grade

    How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

    No hardcoded secrets, secret-shaped tool parameters, or leaked keys found. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

  • Permission scope

    pass15% of grade

    Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

    Network egress present (pyproject declares an HTTP client dependency) — expected for most servers and not a finding on its own. No shell-exec, unbounded/sensitive filesystem, or download-and-run primitives found in scanned source. PASS = no static red flag. Static scanning is blind to code fetched or executed at runtime.

  • Version behavior

    fail10% of grade

    Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

    vs prior 1.0.0 (minor bump): tool "attest_response" description changed (wording only, no injection pattern); tool "attest_response" gained input property(ies): audit_quotes; tool "get_law" description changed (wording only, no injection pattern); tool "search_practice" description changed (wording only, no injection pattern); tool "search_practice" gained input property(ies): include_superseded; tool "get_practice" description changed (wording only, no injection pattern); new hardcoded outbound host/BCC destination(s): github.com, opencaselaw.ch.

  • Transport config

    fail10% of grade

    Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

    remote MCP endpoint declares NO authentication (unauthenticated remote — nginx-ui/CVE-2026-33032 class)

Version history

Each release plotted by grade against the safe line at B. A version that sinks below the line has lost its trusted standing — the shape of a rug-pull.

VersionPublishedGradeScoreInspectedChange
v1.3.0 · current2026-07-30 D556/6 · 100%C→D in v1.3.0
v1.0.02026-03-10 C654/6 · 75%