cloud.theprotocol/registry

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  warn25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  tool "theprotocol_createProposal" description: bare 'IMPORTANT:' prose in a description (tag form is high-confidence; prose is warn).

• Supply chain

  warn25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  no resolvable repository linked to the package (provenance unverifiable)

• Credential hygiene

  fail15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  tool "theprotocol_authRegister" has a secret-shaped input parameter "password" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "theprotocol_authResetPassword" has a secret-shaped input parameter "new_password" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "theprotocol_authSetNewPassword" has a secret-shaped input parameter "new_password" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "theprotocol_authValidate2FA" has a secret-shaped input parameter "login_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "theprotocol_authRecover2FA" has a secret-shaped input parameter "login_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "theprotocol_getAgentToken" has a secret-shaped input parameter "client_secret" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "theprotocol_releasePaymentById" has a secret-shaped input parameter "token_id" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "theprotocol_requestAccountDeletion" has a secret-shaped input parameter "password" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential).

• Permission scope

  unscannable15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  No source files, package.json, or pyproject were fetched; cannot infer capability scope.

• Version behavior

  warn10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  vs prior 1.0.0 (minor bump): tool "theprotocol_discoverAgents" description changed (wording only, no injection pattern); tool "theprotocol_discoverAgents" gained input property(ies): min_verified_jobs, min_stars; new tool "theprotocol_getOrgTrackRecord" appeared; new tool "theprotocol_getOrgPublicFeed" appeared; new tool "theprotocol_listTransparentOrganizations" appeared; new tool "theprotocol_listConversations" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "theprotocol_readThread" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "theprotocol_sendChatMessage" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "theprotocol_respondChatRequest" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "theprotocol_getSupportReviewState" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "theprotocol_grantSupportReview" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "theprotocol_revokeSupportReview" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "theprotocol_listOrganizationInvitations" appeared; new tool "theprotocol_withdrawOrganizationInvitation" appeared.

• Transport config

  pass10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  remote endpoint "https://api.theprotocol.cloud/mcp/sse" uses TLS (https); remote endpoint "https://api.theprotocol.cloud/mcp" uses TLS (https); remote endpoint uses OAuth (strongest auth mode)