com.aave/mcp

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  pass25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  Scanned 406 text field(s); no instruction-injection patterns found. PASS = no static red flag. A server can serve different tool descriptions at runtime (the rug-pull class), which static scanning cannot see.

• Supply chain

  fail25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  package name "@aave/mcp" is edit-distance 2 from popular package "yup" (typosquat candidate); corroborated by repo mismatch/missing; dependency "@aave/client" is edit-distance 2 from popular package "@aws-sdk/client-s3" (typosquat candidate); corroborated by repo mismatch/missing; dependency "@aave/client-v3" is edit-distance 1 from popular package "@aws-sdk/client-s3" (typosquat candidate); corroborated by repo mismatch/missing; dependency "@modelcontextprotocol/core" is edit-distance 1 from popular package "cors" (typosquat candidate); corroborated by repo mismatch/missing; dependency "@modelcontextprotocol/server" is edit-distance 1 from popular package "semver" (typosquat candidate); corroborated by repo mismatch/missing; no resolvable repository linked to the package (provenance unverifiable)

• Credential hygiene

  fail15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  tool "prepare_liquidation" has a secret-shaped input parameter "collateralToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "prepare_liquidation" has a secret-shaped input parameter "debtToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential).

• Permission scope

  pass15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  Network egress present (src/analytics.ts: outbound HTTP/socket call) — expected for most servers and not a finding on its own. No shell-exec, unbounded/sensitive filesystem, or download-and-run primitives found in scanned source. PASS = no static red flag. Static scanning is blind to code fetched or executed at runtime.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of com.aave/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  fail10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  remote MCP endpoint declares NO authentication (unauthenticated remote — nginx-ui/CVE-2026-33032 class); sends telemetry to third-party SDK (amplitude) — disclosure, verify opt-in; manifest/source references analytics behavior — disclosure