MCP server · trust report

com.bidda/bidda-compliance

2 checks that ran failed — credential hygiene and transport config — so this release can’t be trusted as-is.

Publisher
com.bidda
Repository
Install
remote only
Versions
4
Inspected
4 of 6 checks · 75%
Scored
2026-07-21 · rubric 1.0.0

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

6 checks1 clean3 flagged2 not inspected
  • Injection surface

    pass25% of grade

    Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

    Scanned 216 text field(s); no instruction-injection patterns found. PASS = no static red flag. A server can serve different tool descriptions at runtime (the rug-pull class), which static scanning cannot see.

  • Supply chain

    warn25% of grade

    Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

    no resolvable repository linked to the package (provenance unverifiable)

  • Credential hygiene

    fail15% of grade

    How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

    tool "compare_jurisdictions" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "create_attestation" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "point_in_time" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "watch_changes" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "open_run" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "record_run_entry" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "consult_node" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_audit_pack" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "seal_run" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_run" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "drift_check" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "create_control_attestation" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "gap_check" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "obligation_deltas" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "oscal_assessment_results" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential).

  • Permission scope

    unscannable15% of grade

    Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

    No source files, package.json, or pyproject were fetched; cannot infer capability scope.

  • Version behavior

    unscannable10% of grade

    Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

    no prior version to diff (first sight of com.bidda/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

  • Transport config

    fail10% of grade

    Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

    remote MCP endpoint declares NO authentication (unauthenticated remote — nginx-ui/CVE-2026-33032 class)

Version history

Each release plotted by grade against the safe line at B. A version that sinks below the line has lost its trusted standing — the shape of a rug-pull.

VersionPublishedGradeScoreInspectedChange
v1.6.0 · current2026-07-13 C62.54/6 · 75%