MCP server · trust report

com.boosthis/boosthis

2 checks that ran failed — injection surface and credential hygiene — so this release can’t be trusted as-is.

Publisher
com.boosthis
Repository
Install
remote only
Versions
1
MCP revision
2025-06-18 · superseded
Inspected
4 of 6 checks · 75%
Scored
2026-09-03 · rubric 1.0.0

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

6 checks1 clean3 flagged2 not inspected
  • Injection surface

    fail25% of grade

    Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

    tool "boosthis_vigilance" description: text addressed to the model rather than describing a capability. tool "boosthis_get_integration_kit" description: off-vendor URL in a description (www.boosthis.com); capability text should not name where data goes. tool "boosthis_get_integration_kit" param "runtime" description: off-vendor URL in a description (www.boosthis.com); capability text should not name where data goes. tool "boosthis_check_for_update" description: off-vendor URL in a description (www.boosthis.com); capability text should not name where data goes. tool "boosthis_verify_kit_install" description: off-vendor URL in a description (www.boosthis.com); capability text should not name where data goes. server instructions: off-vendor URL in a description (www.boosthis.com); capability text should not name where data goes.

  • Supply chain

    warn25% of grade

    Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

    no resolvable repository linked to the package (provenance unverifiable)

  • Credential hygiene

    fail15% of grade

    How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

    tool "boosthis_session_summary" has a secret-shaped input parameter "read_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "boosthis_recent_samples" has a secret-shaped input parameter "read_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "boosthis_budgets" has a secret-shaped input parameter "read_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "boosthis_what_should_i_look_at_next" has a secret-shaped input parameter "read_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "boosthis_snapshot" has a secret-shaped input parameter "read_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "boosthis_crash_risk" has a secret-shaped input parameter "read_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "boosthis_full_stack_trace" has a secret-shaped input parameter "read_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "boosthis_maintenance_mix" has a secret-shaped input parameter "account_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "boosthis_trend" has a secret-shaped input parameter "read_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "boosthis_vigilance" has a secret-shaped input parameter "read_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "boosthis_jobs" has a secret-shaped input parameter "read_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "boosthis_alerts" has a secret-shaped input parameter "account_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "boosthis_remember_promise" has a secret-shaped input parameter "account_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "boosthis_check_claim" has a secret-shaped input parameter "account_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential).

  • Permission scope

    unscannable15% of grade

    Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

    No source files, package.json, or pyproject were fetched; cannot infer capability scope.

  • Version behavior

    unscannable10% of grade

    Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

    no prior version to diff (first sight of com.boosthis/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

  • Transport config

    pass10% of grade

    Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

    remote endpoint "https://www.boosthis.com/mcp" uses TLS (https); remote endpoint uses OAuth (strongest auth mode)

Version history

Each release plotted by grade against the safe line at B. A version that sinks below the line has lost its trusted standing — the shape of a rug-pull.

VersionPublishedGradeScoreInspectedChange
v1.0.0-alpha.82 · current2026-08-04 D47.54/6 · 75%