com.clearedindex/mcp

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  warn25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  tool "lookup_merchant" param "origin" description: off-vendor URL in a description (api.example.com); capability text should not name where data goes. tool "cleared_check" param "origin" description: off-vendor URL in a description (api.example.com); capability text should not name where data goes. tool "submit_for_review" param "origin" description: off-vendor URL in a description (api.example.com); capability text should not name where data goes.

• Supply chain

  pass25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  repository linkage verified

• Credential hygiene

  pass15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  No hardcoded secrets, secret-shaped tool parameters, or leaked keys found. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

• Permission scope

  pass15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  No shell-exec, unbounded/sensitive filesystem, or download-and-run primitives found in scanned source. PASS = no static red flag. Static scanning is blind to code fetched or executed at runtime.

• Version behavior

  fail10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  vs prior 1.4.1 (patch bump): new tool "lookup_merchant" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "get_cleared_status" appeared; new tool "route_gateway" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "check_domain_status" appeared; new tool "get_trust_score" appeared; new tool "cleared_check" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "report_delivery" appeared; new tool "witness_settlement" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "agent_read" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "cleared_verdict" appeared; new tool "cleared_run_gate" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "cleared_arena" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "list_cleared_services" appeared; new tool "submit_for_review" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "get_badge" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs).

• Transport config

  unscannable10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  local stdio server: no remote transport or auth surface, and no phone-home/telemetry signal found in source. Absence of transport findings is NOT a safety guarantee — phone-home hosts can be constructed at runtime and defeat static analysis.