com.debugbundle/mcp

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  pass25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  Scanned 857 text field(s); no instruction-injection patterns found. PASS = no static red flag. A server can serve different tool descriptions at runtime (the rug-pull class), which static scanning cannot see.

• Supply chain

  warn25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  package name "@debugbundle/mcp" is edit-distance 2 from popular package "yup" (typosquat candidate)

• Credential hygiene

  fail15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  tool "list_incidents" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_incident" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_incident_context" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "resolve_incident" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "resolve_incidents" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "reopen_incident" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "reopen_incidents" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_bundle" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_reproduction" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_logs" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "list_improvements" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_improvement" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_improvement_bundle" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "resolve_improvement" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "reopen_improvement" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "snooze_improvement" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_github_status" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "list_github_repositories" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "list_github_dispatch_rules" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "create_github_dispatch_rule" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "update_github_dispatch_rule" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "delete_github_dispatch_rule" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "list_github_deliveries" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "retry_github_delivery" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "set_project_github_repo" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "remove_project_github_repo" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "list_project_tokens" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "create_project_token" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "revoke_project_token" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "revoke_project_token" has a secret-shaped input parameter "tokenId" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "list_member_tokens" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "create_member_token" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "revoke_member_token" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "revoke_member_token" has a secret-shaped input parameter "tokenId" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "list_webhooks" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "create_webhook" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "update_webhook" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "delete_webhook" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "test_webhook" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "list_webhook_deliveries" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "retry_webhook_delivery" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "list_slack_destinations" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_slack_connect_url" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "test_slack_destination" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "delete_slack_destination" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "list_weekly_report_channels" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "create_weekly_report_channel" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "update_weekly_report_channel" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "delete_weekly_report_channel" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "list_alerts" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "create_alert" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "update_alert" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "delete_alert" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "list_projects" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "create_project" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "update_project" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "delete_project" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "list_capture_rules" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "create_capture_rule" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "update_capture_rule" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "delete_capture_rule" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "suggest_capture_rules_from_incident" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "create_capture_rule_from_incident_suggestion" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_usage_summary" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_route_metrics" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_journey_patterns" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "list_analytics_journey_samples" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_analytics_journey_sample" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_device_breakdown" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_referrer_metrics" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_action_metrics" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "list_funnel_metrics" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_funnel_analysis" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_incident_impact" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "list_analytics_opportunities" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_analytics_opportunity" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "list_analytics_bundles" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "generate_analytics_bundle" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_analytics_bundle" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_analytics_settings" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "update_analytics_settings" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "list_saved_analytics_funnels" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "create_saved_analytics_funnel" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "update_saved_analytics_funnel" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "archive_saved_analytics_funnel" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_capture_policy" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "update_capture_policy" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_improvement_settings" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "update_improvement_settings" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "activate_probe" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "list_active_probes" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "deactivate_probe" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "list_health_checks" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_health_check" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "create_health_check" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "update_health_check" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "delete_health_check" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "test_health_check" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "list_health_check_results" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "list_health_check_daily_rollups" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_billing_summary" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "start_trial" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "increase_capacity" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "schedule_capacity_reduction" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "cancel_capacity_reduction" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "list_project_members" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "list_project_member_invites" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "invite_project_member" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "cancel_project_member_invite" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "update_project_member_role" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "remove_project_member" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "leave_project" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "list_services" has a secret-shaped input parameter "bearerToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential).

• Permission scope

  pass15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  No shell-exec, unbounded/sensitive filesystem, or download-and-run primitives found in scanned source. PASS = no static red flag. Static scanning is blind to code fetched or executed at runtime.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of com.debugbundle/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  unscannable10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  local stdio server: no remote transport or auth surface, and no phone-home/telemetry signal found in source. Absence of transport findings is NOT a safety guarantee — phone-home hosts can be constructed at runtime and defeat static analysis.