com.docimprint/api

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  warn25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  tool "url.extract" description: off-vendor URL in a description (example.com); capability text should not name where data goes. tool "url.extract" param "url" description: off-vendor URL in a description (example.com); capability text should not name where data goes. tool "url.extract" param "url" description: off-vendor URL in a description (blog.example.com); capability text should not name where data goes. tool "url.summarize" description: off-vendor URL in a description (en.wikipedia.org); capability text should not name where data goes. tool "url.summarize" param "url" description: off-vendor URL in a description (en.wikipedia.org); capability text should not name where data goes. tool "url.translate" description: off-vendor URL in a description (example.de); capability text should not name where data goes. tool "url.translate" param "url" description: off-vendor URL in a description (example.de); capability text should not name where data goes.

• Supply chain

  pass25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  repository linkage verified

• Credential hygiene

  pass15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  No hardcoded secrets, secret-shaped tool parameters, or leaked keys found. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

• Permission scope

  unscannable15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  No source files, package.json, or pyproject were fetched; cannot infer capability scope.

• Version behavior

  fail10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  vs prior 1.0.3 (patch bump): new tool "document.extract_text" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "document.extract_tables" appeared; new tool "document.parse_invoice" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "document.check_claims" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "document.extract_structured" appeared; new tool "document.summarize" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "bundle.verify" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "collection.create" appeared; new tool "collection.search" appeared; new tool "collection.ask" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "url.extract" whose description contains embedded outbound URL; new tool "url.summarize" whose description contains embedded outbound URL; new tool "url.qa" whose description contains embedded outbound URL; new tool "url.translate" whose description contains embedded outbound URL; new tool "bundle.get" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "bundle.notarize" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "receipt.verify" appeared; new tool "receipt.list" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "job.status" appeared; new tool "collection.list" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "collection.add_document" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "account.quota" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs).

• Transport config

  fail10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  remote MCP endpoint declares NO authentication (unauthenticated remote — nginx-ui/CVE-2026-33032 class)