com.dpf-it/mcp-server

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  warn25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  tool "manage_trigger" description: bare 'IMPORTANT:' prose in a description (tag form is high-confidence; prose is warn). tool "onboard_data_source" description: 'before using this tool…' preamble (tool-poisoning shape). tool "onboard_data_source" param "merge" description: cross-tool redirection ('instead of call…'). tool "call_dpf_api" description: off-vendor URL in a description (dpf-it.com); capability text should not name where data goes.

• Supply chain

  warn25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  no resolvable repository linked to the package (provenance unverifiable)

• Credential hygiene

  pass15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  No hardcoded secrets, secret-shaped tool parameters, or leaked keys found. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

• Permission scope

  pass15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  No shell-exec, unbounded/sensitive filesystem, or download-and-run primitives found in scanned source. PASS = no static red flag. Static scanning is blind to code fetched or executed at runtime.

• Version behavior

  fail10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  vs prior 0.1.11 (major bump): new tool "list_my_workspaces" appeared; new tool "create_workspace" appeared; new tool "list_data" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "get_status" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "delete_data_spec" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "submit_query" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "manage_connection" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "manage_trigger" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "onboard_data_source" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "finish_data_source_onboarding" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "update_data_spec" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "finish_data_spec_update" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "run_data_job" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "finish_data_job" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "setup_scheduled_pull" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "call_dpf_api" whose description contains embedded outbound URL; new tool "manage_account" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "contact" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new hardcoded outbound host/BCC destination(s): dpf-it.com.

• Transport config

  pass10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  remote endpoint "https://api.dpf-it.com/mcp" uses TLS (https); remote endpoint uses OAuth (strongest auth mode)