com.graqle/graqle

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  fail25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  Python build script executes at build time: subprocess in build script, network call in build script

• Credential hygiene

  warn15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  tests/test_scanner/test_privacy.py: embeds a PRIVATE KEY block. (in an example/sample file — lower severity, but a real key here still leaks.) tests/test_scanner/test_privacy.py: contains a hardcoded OpenAI API key (sk-p…45 (len 38)) — in an example/sample file; verify it is not a real key. tests/test_scanner/test_privacy.py: contains a hardcoded Slack token (xoxb…ke (len 19)) — in an example/sample file; verify it is not a real key. tests/test_scanner/test_privacy.py: contains a hardcoded JWT (eyJh…8U (len 108)) — in an example/sample file; verify it is not a real key. tests/test_server/test_stripe_webhook.py: assigns a literal to secret (whse…23 (len 13)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. .claude/skills/ui-ux-pro-max-skill/.claude/skills/design/scripts/cip/generate.py) — the recommended intake shape.

• Permission scope

  fail15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  HIGH: graqle/cli/commands/doctor.py: references a sensitive credential path (.aws/credentials) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: graqle/cli/commands/init.py: references a sensitive credential path (/mcp.json) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: shell/exec capability AND network egress together — download-and-execute risk (.claude/skills/ui-ux-pro-max-skill/.claude/skills/brand/scripts/sync-brand-to-tokens.cjs: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn; .claude/skills/ui-ux-pro-max-skill/cli/src/utils/github.ts: outbound HTTP/socket call). HIGH: shell/exec capability AND destructive filesystem writes together (.claude/skills/ui-ux-pro-max-skill/.claude/skills/brand/scripts/sync-brand-to-tokens.cjs: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn; .claude/skills/ui-ux-pro-max-skill/.claude/skills/brand/scripts/sync-brand-to-tokens.cjs: destructive/writing fs.* call (write/unlink/rm/chmod/rename)). discloses shell/exec capability: .claude/skills/ui-ux-pro-max-skill/.claude/skills/brand/scripts/sync-brand-to-tokens.cjs: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn discloses shell/exec capability: .claude/skills/ui-ux-pro-max-skill/.claude/skills/design-system/scripts/slide-token-validator.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: .claude/skills/ui-ux-pro-max-skill/.claude/skills/ui-styling/scripts/shadcn_add.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: .claude/skills/ui-ux-pro-max-skill/cli/src/utils/extract.ts: imports child_process discloses shell/exec capability: graqle/cli/main.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: graqle/cli/commands/grow.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: graqle/cli/commands/plugins.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: graqle/cli/commands/selfupdate.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: graqle/intelligence/verify.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: graqle/runtime/fetcher.py: subprocess.* call discloses dynamic code execution: sdk_self_audit.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: graqle/runtime/fetcher.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: tests/test_cli/test_bench_failfast.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: .claude/skills/ui-ux-pro-max-skill/.claude/skills/brand/scripts/sync-brand-to-tokens.cjs: destructive/writing fs.* call (write/unlink/rm/chmod/rename) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: .claude/skills/ui-ux-pro-max-skill/.claude/skills/design/scripts/cip/generate.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: .claude/skills/ui-ux-pro-max-skill/.claude/skills/design/scripts/logo/generate.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: .claude/skills/ui-ux-pro-max-skill/.claude/skills/design-system/scripts/generate-slide.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: .claude/skills/ui-ux-pro-max-skill/.claude/skills/design-system/scripts/generate-tokens.cjs: destructive/writing fs.* call (write/unlink/rm/chmod/rename) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: .claude/skills/ui-ux-pro-max-skill/.claude/skills/design-system/scripts/validate-tokens.cjs: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: .claude/skills/ui-ux-pro-max-skill/cli/src/index.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: .claude/skills/ui-ux-pro-max-skill/cli/src/utils/detect.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: .claude/skills/ui-ux-pro-max-skill/cli/src/utils/template.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: graqle/cli/commands/init.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: graqle/core/graph.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: graqle/core/graph.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: graqle/intelligence/verify.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_cli/test_init.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of com.graqle/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  fail10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  source performs runtime self-update / download-and-execute (bypasses version_behavior); manifest/source references tracking behavior — disclosure