MCP server · trust report

com.graqle/graqle

3 checks that ran failed — supply chain, permission scope and transport config — so this release can’t be trusted as-is.

Publisher
com.graqle
Repository
github.com/quantamixsol/graqle
Install
pypi:graqle
Versions
1
Inspected
4 of 6 checks · 65%
Scored
2026-09-02 · rubric 1.0.0

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

6 checks0 clean4 flagged2 not inspected
  • Injection surface

    unscannable25% of grade

    Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

    No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

  • Supply chain

    fail25% of grade

    Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

    Python build script executes at build time: subprocess in build script, network call in build script

  • Credential hygiene

    warn15% of grade

    How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

    tests/test_scanner/test_privacy.py: embeds a PRIVATE KEY block. (in an example/sample file — lower severity, but a real key here still leaks.) tests/test_scanner/test_privacy.py: contains a hardcoded OpenAI API key (sk-p…45 (len 38)) — in an example/sample file; verify it is not a real key. tests/test_scanner/test_privacy.py: contains a hardcoded Slack token (xoxb…ke (len 19)) — in an example/sample file; verify it is not a real key. tests/test_scanner/test_privacy.py: contains a hardcoded JWT (eyJh…8U (len 108)) — in an example/sample file; verify it is not a real key. tests/test_server/test_stripe_webhook.py: assigns a literal to secret (whse…23 (len 13)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. .claude/skills/ui-ux-pro-max-skill/.claude/skills/design/scripts/cip/generate.py) — the recommended intake shape.

  • Permission scope

    fail15% of grade

    Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

    HIGH: downloads and pipes straight to a shell (graqle/cli/commands/plugins.py: pipes a download into a shell). HIGH: executes content derived from a network response (graqle/cli/main.py: passes a network response into an exec/eval call). has both shell/exec and destructive filesystem writes (.claude/skills/ui-ux-pro-max-skill/.claude/skills/brand/scripts/sync-brand-to-tokens.cjs: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn; .claude/skills/ui-ux-pro-max-skill/.claude/skills/brand/scripts/sync-brand-to-tokens.cjs: destructive/writing fs.* call (write/unlink/rm/chmod/rename)). discloses shell/exec capability: 10 files (.claude/skills/ui-ux-pro-max-skill/.claude/skills/brand/scripts/sync-brand-to-tokens.cjs, .claude/skills/ui-ux-pro-max-skill/.claude/skills/design-system/scripts/slide-token-validator.py, .claude/skills/ui-ux-pro-max-skill/.claude/skills/ui-styling/scripts/shadcn_add.py, +7 more) discloses dynamic code execution: sdk_self_audit.py: uses eval()/exec() discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: 6 files (.claude/skills/ui-ux-pro-max-skill/.claude/skills/brand/scripts/sync-brand-to-tokens.cjs, .claude/skills/ui-ux-pro-max-skill/.claude/skills/design/scripts/cip/generate.py, .claude/skills/ui-ux-pro-max-skill/.claude/skills/design/scripts/logo/generate.py, +3 more) Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

  • Version behavior

    unscannable10% of grade

    Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

    no prior version to diff (first sight of com.graqle/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

  • Transport config

    fail10% of grade

    Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

    source performs runtime self-update / download-and-execute (bypasses version_behavior); manifest/source references tracking behavior — disclosure

Version history

Each release plotted by grade against the safe line at B. A version that sinks below the line has lost its trusted standing — the shape of a rug-pull.

VersionPublishedGradeScoreInspectedChange
v0.27.0 · current2026-03-16 D42.54/6 · 65%