com.homebridgepc.agent-commerce/halo-ai-surfaces

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  warn25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  tool "get_homebridge_major_category_catalog" description: imperative telling the model it must read/send/attach something.

• Supply chain

  warn25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  no resolvable repository linked to the package (provenance unverifiable)

• Credential hygiene

  pass15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  No hardcoded secrets, secret-shaped tool parameters, or leaked keys found. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

• Permission scope

  unscannable15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  No source files, package.json, or pyproject were fetched; cannot infer capability scope.

• Version behavior

  warn10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  vs prior 1.0.1 (minor bump): tool "configure_homebridge_fire_pit" description changed (wording only, no injection pattern); tool "get_homebridge_major_category_catalog" description changed (wording only, no injection pattern); tool "resolve_homebridge_major_variant" description changed (wording only, no injection pattern); new tool "get_halo_connection_status" appeared; new tool "qualify_homebridge_fire_pit" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "get_homebridge_product_media" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "display_homebridge_product_media" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs).

• Transport config

  pass10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  remote endpoint "https://agent-commerce.homebridgepc.com/mcp-v2" uses TLS (https); remote endpoint uses OAuth (strongest auth mode)