com.mnemopay/gridstamp

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  pass25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  repository linkage verified

• Credential hygiene

  warn15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  tests/stress/load.test.ts: assigns a literal to SECRET (a]9#…G0 (len 32)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/stress/mega-simulation.bench.ts: assigns a literal to SECRET (mega…h! (len 32)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/stress/production-100k.test.ts: assigns a literal to SECRET (a]9#…G0 (len 32)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/stress/production-15k.test.ts: assigns a literal to SECRET (a]9#…G0 (len 32)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/stress/stress-200k.test.ts: assigns a literal to SECRET (a]9#…G0 (len 32)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/stress/stress-300k.test.ts: assigns a literal to SECRET (a]9#…G0 (len 32)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/stress/summer-2026-simulation.bench.ts: assigns a literal to SECRET (summ…!! (len 33)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. gtm/send-batch-2.mjs) — the recommended intake shape.

• Permission scope

  warn15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: gtm/send-batch-2.mjs: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: gtm/send-robotics-outreach.mjs: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: examples/agent-proof-of-presence.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/gamification/badges.test.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/gamification/badges.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: benchmark/longmemeval/evaluate-elephant.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/gamification/fleet-leaderboard.test.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/gamification/fleet-leaderboard.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/navigation/pathfinding.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/agent/proof-agent.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/mcp/server.ts: destructive/writing fs.* call (write/unlink/rm/chmod/rename) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/verification/spatial-proof.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/gamification/streaks.test.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/gamification/streaks.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/stress/stress-200k.test.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/stress/summer-2026-simulation.bench.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/gamification/trust-tiers.test.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/gamification/trust-tiers.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/gamification/zone-mastery.test.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/gamification/zone-mastery.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of com.mnemopay/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  warn10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  manifest/source references telemetry behavior — disclosure