com.newscatcherapi/catchall

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  fail25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  tool "assign_webhook_resource" description: names an outbound copy/exfil destination (BCC/exfil verb). tool "get_job_status" description: bare 'IMPORTANT:' prose in a description (tag form is high-confidence; prose is warn). tool "list_webhooks" description: imperative telling the model it must read/send/attach something. server instructions: bare 'IMPORTANT:' prose in a description (tag form is high-confidence; prose is warn). server instructions: off-vendor URL in a description (platform.newscatcherapi.com); capability text should not name where data goes.

• Supply chain

  pass25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  repository linkage verified

• Credential hygiene

  fail15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  tool "submit_query" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "initialize_query" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_job_status" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "pull_results" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "pull_job_csv" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "continue_job" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "list_user_jobs" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "delete_job" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "validate_query" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "list_source_groups" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "create_monitor" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "list_monitors" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "pull_monitor_results" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "pull_monitor_csv" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "list_monitor_jobs" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "disable_monitor" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "enable_monitor" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "update_monitor" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "delete_monitor" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_monitor_status" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "list_webhooks" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "create_webhook" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_webhook" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "update_webhook" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "delete_webhook" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "test_webhook" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "assign_webhook_resource" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "list_webhook_resources" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "remove_webhook_resource" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "list_resource_webhooks" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_webhook_history" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "trigger_webhook" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "create_dataset" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "list_datasets" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_dataset" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "update_dataset" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "delete_dataset" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "add_dataset_entities" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "remove_dataset_entities" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "list_dataset_entities" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_dataset_status" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "create_dataset_from_csv" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "append_csv_to_dataset" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "create_entity" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "list_entities" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "create_entities_batch" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_entity" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "update_entity" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "delete_entity" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "create_project" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "list_projects" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_project" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "update_project" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "delete_project" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_project_overview" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "add_project_resources" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "list_project_resources" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "remove_project_resource" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_user_limits" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "check_health" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_version" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential).

• Permission scope

  pass15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  No shell-exec, unbounded/sensitive filesystem, or download-and-run primitives found in scanned source. PASS = no static red flag. Static scanning is blind to code fetched or executed at runtime.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of com.newscatcherapi/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  fail10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  remote MCP endpoint declares NO authentication (unauthenticated remote — nginx-ui/CVE-2026-33032 class)