com.oliverkiss/agentic-endpoints

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  warn25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  tool "once_key_claim" param "lease_ttl" description: imperative telling the model it must read/send/attach something. tool "once_key_release" description: cross-tool redirection ('instead of call…').

• Supply chain

  warn25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  dependency "@x402/core" is edit-distance 1 from popular package "cors" (typosquat candidate); dependency "@x402/evm" is edit-distance 2 from popular package "ejs" (typosquat candidate); dependency "@x402/hono" is edit-distance 2 from popular package "pino" (typosquat candidate); dependency "hono" is edit-distance 2 from popular package "pino" (typosquat candidate)

• Credential hygiene

  fail15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  tool "meetings_search" has a secret-shaped input parameter "namespace_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "meetings_import" has a secret-shaped input parameter "namespace_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "meetings_get" has a secret-shaped input parameter "namespace_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "meetings_list" has a secret-shaped input parameter "namespace_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "once_key_claim" has a secret-shaped input parameter "namespace_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "once_key_complete" has a secret-shaped input parameter "namespace_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "once_key_release" has a secret-shaped input parameter "namespace_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "vault_store" has a secret-shaped input parameter "namespace_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "vault_retrieve" has a secret-shaped input parameter "namespace_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "vault_exists" has a secret-shaped input parameter "namespace_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "vault_delete" has a secret-shaped input parameter "namespace_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "vault_list" has a secret-shaped input parameter "namespace_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "vault_rotate_token" has a secret-shaped input parameter "namespace_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential).

• Permission scope

  pass15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  No shell-exec, unbounded/sensitive filesystem, or download-and-run primitives found in scanned source. PASS = no static red flag. Static scanning is blind to code fetched or executed at runtime.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of com.oliverkiss/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  fail10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  remote MCP endpoint declares NO authentication (unauthenticated remote — nginx-ui/CVE-2026-33032 class)