com.papacasper/mcp-toolbelt

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  pass25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  Scanned 140 text field(s); no instruction-injection patterns found. PASS = no static red flag. A server can serve different tool descriptions at runtime (the rug-pull class), which static scanning cannot see.

• Supply chain

  warn25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  no resolvable repository linked to the package (provenance unverifiable)

• Credential hygiene

  pass15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  No hardcoded secrets, secret-shaped tool parameters, or leaked keys found. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

• Permission scope

  unscannable15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  No source files, package.json, or pyproject were fetched; cannot infer capability scope.

• Version behavior

  warn10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  vs prior 1.0.0 (minor bump): new tool "url_to_markdown" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "security_headers_audit" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "redirect_chain_check" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "page_performance_check" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "cors_policy_check" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "structured_data_extract" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "tech_stack_fingerprint" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "ai_crawler_policy_check" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "seo_audit" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "check_robots_sitemap" appeared; new tool "broken_link_check" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "favicon_manifest_check" appeared; new tool "json_ld_schema_validator" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "sitemap_url_validator" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "domain_health_check" appeared; new tool "dns_propagation_check" appeared; new tool "ip_geolocation_asn_lookup" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "email_deliverability_check" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "domain_availability_check" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "ssl_cert_check" appeared; new tool "check_open_ports" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "websocket_endpoint_check" appeared; new tool "domain_report" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "safe_browsing_check" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "ssl_labs_grade" appeared; new tool "pagespeed_insights" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "package_vulnerability_check" appeared; new tool "github_repo_health_check" appeared; new tool "email_address_validate" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs).

• Transport config

  fail10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  remote MCP endpoint declares NO authentication (unauthenticated remote — nginx-ui/CVE-2026-33032 class)