com.ratchetgate/ratchet

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  fail25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  tool "ratchet_begin_effect" description: instruction to hide activity from the user. tool "ratchet_begin_effect" param "dimensions" description: imperative telling the model it must read/send/attach something. tool "ratchet_get_prevented_loss" description: bare 'IMPORTANT:' prose in a description (tag form is high-confidence; prose is warn).

• Supply chain

  pass25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  repository linkage verified

• Credential hygiene

  fail15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  tool "ratchet_report_effect" has a secret-shaped input parameter "lease_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "ratchet_extend_lease" has a secret-shaped input parameter "lease_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. bin/ratchet-mcp.mjs) — the recommended intake shape.

• Permission scope

  pass15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  Network egress present (bin/ratchet-mcp.mjs: outbound HTTP/socket call) — expected for most servers and not a finding on its own. No shell-exec, unbounded/sensitive filesystem, or download-and-run primitives found in scanned source. PASS = no static red flag. Static scanning is blind to code fetched or executed at runtime.

• Version behavior

  fail10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  vs prior 0.2.0 (minor bump): new capability primitive(s) in source: http-client; new hardcoded outbound host/BCC destination(s): api.mainnet-beta.solana.com, ethereum.publicnode.com, github.com, mempool.space, ratchetgate.com.

• Transport config

  pass10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  remote endpoint "https://ratchetgate.com/mcp" uses TLS (https); remote endpoint uses OAuth (strongest auth mode)