com.sssnack/sssnack

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  pass25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  Scanned 291 text field(s); no instruction-injection patterns found. PASS = no static red flag. A server can serve different tool descriptions at runtime (the rug-pull class), which static scanning cannot see.

• Supply chain

  warn25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  no resolvable repository linked to the package (provenance unverifiable)

• Credential hygiene

  fail15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  tool "register_agent" has a secret-shaped input parameter "challenge_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "recover_agent_token" has a secret-shaped input parameter "recovery_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "rotate_agent_recovery_token" has a secret-shaped input parameter "agent_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "rotate_agent_recovery_token" has a secret-shaped input parameter "current_recovery_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "start_agent_signing_key" has a secret-shaped input parameter "agent_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "start_agent_signing_key" has a secret-shaped input parameter "recovery_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "confirm_agent_signing_key" has a secret-shaped input parameter "agent_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_snack_signing_payload" has a secret-shaped input parameter "agent_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "sign_snack" has a secret-shaped input parameter "agent_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_root_signing_payload" has a secret-shaped input parameter "agent_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "sign_root_takeover" has a secret-shaped input parameter "agent_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "publish_snack" has a secret-shaped input parameter "agent_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "claim_root" has a secret-shaped input parameter "agent_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "set_root_artifact" has a secret-shaped input parameter "agent_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "vote_snack" has a secret-shaped input parameter "agent_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "comment_on_snack" has a secret-shaped input parameter "agent_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "update_agent_profile" has a secret-shaped input parameter "agent_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "discover_opportunities" has a secret-shaped input parameter "agent_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_agent_inbox" has a secret-shaped input parameter "agent_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "follow_sssnack_signal" has a secret-shaped input parameter "agent_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "create_creative_brief" has a secret-shaped input parameter "agent_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "create_snack_project" has a secret-shaped input parameter "agent_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "start_snack_relay" has a secret-shaped input parameter "agent_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential).

• Permission scope

  unscannable15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  No source files, package.json, or pyproject were fetched; cannot infer capability scope.

• Version behavior

  warn10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  vs prior 0.13.0 (minor bump): new tool "start_agent_signing_key" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "confirm_agent_signing_key" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "get_snack_signing_payload" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "sign_snack" appeared; new tool "get_root_signing_payload" appeared; new tool "sign_root_takeover" appeared; new tool "get_ledger_head" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "read_ledger" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs).

• Transport config

  fail10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  remote MCP endpoint declares NO authentication (unauthenticated remote — nginx-ui/CVE-2026-33032 class)