com.thingctx/thingctx

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  fail25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  Python build script executes at build time: network call in build script

• Credential hygiene

  warn15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  tests/test_auth_jwt_bearer.py: assigns a literal to TOKEN (jwt-…en (len 23)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/test_oauth2.py: assigns a literal to token (http…en (len 23)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/test_oauth2_live.py: assigns a literal to TOKEN (real…en (len 17)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/test_provider.py: assigns a literal to token (http…en (len 55)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/test_provider.py: assigns a literal to token (http…en (len 43)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/test_provider.py: assigns a literal to token (TOKE…23 (len 12)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/test_provider.py: assigns a literal to token (defa…en (len 19)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/test_provider.py: assigns a literal to token (cach…en (len 12)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/test_provider.py: assigns a literal to token (ENTR…YZ (len 16)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. src/thingctx/auth/secret.py) — the recommended intake shape.

• Permission scope

  fail15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  HIGH: shell/exec capability AND network egress together — download-and-execute risk (tests/test_examples_smoke.py: subprocess.* call; src/thingctx/auth/oauth_consent.py: outbound HTTP/socket call). HIGH: shell/exec capability AND destructive filesystem writes together (tests/test_examples_smoke.py: subprocess.* call; src/thingctx/bindings/builtin/media/backends.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.)). discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_examples_smoke.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_lean_core.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_media_remux.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_media_roundtrip_matrix.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_mqtt_live.py: subprocess.* call discloses dynamic code execution: tests/test_exec_binding.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/thingctx/bindings/builtin/media/backends.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/thingctx/chain.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/thingctx/netpolicy.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_dogfood_surface.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_hardening.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_media_remux.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of com.thingctx/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  warn10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  manifest/source references Telemetry behavior — disclosure