com.uptybots/monitoring

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  warn25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  tool "create_http_monitor" param "url" description: off-vendor URL in a description (example.com); capability text should not name where data goes. tool "create_api_monitor" param "url" description: off-vendor URL in a description (api.example.com); capability text should not name where data goes.

• Supply chain

  warn25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  no resolvable repository linked to the package (provenance unverifiable)

• Credential hygiene

  pass15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. lib/api.js) — the recommended intake shape. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

• Permission scope

  pass15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  Network egress present (lib/api.js: outbound HTTP/socket call) — expected for most servers and not a finding on its own. No shell-exec, unbounded/sensitive filesystem, or download-and-run primitives found in scanned source. PASS = no static red flag. Static scanning is blind to code fetched or executed at runtime.

• Version behavior

  fail10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  vs prior 1.1.0 (minor bump): new tool "list_monitors" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "get_monitor" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "create_http_monitor" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "create_api_monitor" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "create_ping_monitor" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "create_port_monitor" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "create_ssl_monitor" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "create_domain_monitor" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "pause_monitor" appeared; new tool "resume_monitor" appeared; new tool "delete_monitor" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "get_incidents" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "get_stats_hourly" appeared; new tool "get_stats_daily" appeared; new tool "get_notifications" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new capability primitive(s) in source: http-client; new hardcoded outbound host/BCC destination(s): example.com, github.com, uptybots.com.

• Transport config

  pass10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  remote endpoint "https://mcp.uptybots.com/mcp" uses TLS (https); remote endpoint uses OAuth (strongest auth mode)