dev.deadends/deadends-dev

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  pass25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  Python build script has no build-time network/exec; repository linkage verified

• Credential hygiene

  pass15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  No hardcoded secrets, secret-shaped tool parameters, or leaked keys found. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

• Permission scope

  fail15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  HIGH: generator/bulk_generate_v13.py: references a sensitive credential path (/.ssh/) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: generator/bulk_generate_v3.py: references a sensitive credential path (/.ssh/) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: shell/exec capability AND network egress together — download-and-execute risk (generator/bulk_generate_v8.py: subprocess.* call with shell=True (command-injection prone); generator/collect_evidence.py: outbound HTTP/socket call). HIGH: shell/exec capability AND destructive filesystem writes together (generator/bulk_generate_v8.py: subprocess.* call with shell=True (command-injection prone); generator/build_site.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.)). discloses shell/exec capability: generator/bulk_generate_v8.py: subprocess.* call with shell=True (command-injection prone) discloses shell/exec capability: generator/pipeline.py: subprocess.* call discloses dynamic code execution: generator/bulk_generate_v13.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: generator/bulk_generate_v15.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: generator/bulk_generate_v2.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: generator/bulk_generate_v6.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: generator/build_site.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: generator/build_site.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: generator/bulk_generate_v5.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: generator/bulk_generate_v7.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: generator/validate.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of dev.deadends/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  warn10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  manifest/source references tracking behavior — disclosure