dev.homespun/homespun

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  fail25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  tool "connections" description: names an outbound copy/exfil destination (BCC/exfil verb). tool "connections" param "allowed_host" description: names an outbound copy/exfil destination (BCC/exfil verb). tool "feedback" description: names an outbound copy/exfil destination (BCC/exfil verb).

• Supply chain

  warn25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  package name "@homespunapps/mcp" is edit-distance 2 from popular package "yup" (typosquat candidate); dependency "@homespunapps/core" is edit-distance 1 from popular package "cors" (typosquat candidate)

• Credential hygiene

  fail15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  tool "credentials" has a secret-shaped input parameter "credential_id" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "connections" has a secret-shaped input parameter "token_endpoint" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "connections" has a secret-shaped input parameter "client_secret" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "connections" has a secret-shaped input parameter "token_params" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "ingest" has a secret-shaped input parameter "secret" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "attachments" has a secret-shaped input parameter "token_id" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential).

• Permission scope

  pass15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  No shell-exec, unbounded/sensitive filesystem, or download-and-run primitives found in scanned source. PASS = no static red flag. Static scanning is blind to code fetched or executed at runtime.

• Version behavior

  fail10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  vs prior 1.6.77 (patch bump): new hardcoded outbound host/BCC destination(s): docs.homespun.dev, github.com.

• Transport config

  pass10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  remote endpoint "https://homespun.dev/mcp" uses TLS (https); remote endpoint uses OAuth (strongest auth mode)