dev.servonaut/servonaut

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  fail25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  Python build script executes at build time: network call in build script

• Credential hygiene

  warn15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  tests/test_ai_analysis_service.py: assigns a literal to api_key ($OPE…EY (len 15)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/test_ai_analysis_service.py: assigns a literal to api_key ($ANT…EY (len 14)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/test_ai_analysis_service.py: assigns a literal to api_key (gemi…ey (len 14)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/test_ai_analysis_service.py: assigns a literal to api_key (secr…ey (len 17)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/test_ai_analysis_service.py: assigns a literal to api_key ($GEM…EY (len 15)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/test_bw_resolver.py: embeds a PRIVATE KEY block. (in an example/sample file — lower severity, but a real key here still leaks.) tests/test_cli_ssh.py: embeds a PRIVATE KEY block. (in an example/sample file — lower severity, but a real key here still leaks.) tests/test_config_sync_service.py: assigns a literal to api_key (sk-s…ey (len 13)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/test_ephemeral_key.py: embeds a PRIVATE KEY block. (in an example/sample file — lower severity, but a real key here still leaks.) tests/test_incident_response_tools.py: assigns a literal to password ({_SE…W} (len 12)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/test_relay_log.py: assigns a literal to token (secr…ue (len 12)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. scripts/demo_fleet.py) — the recommended intake shape.

• Permission scope

  fail15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  HIGH: src/servonaut/cli/hetzner.py: references a sensitive credential path (/.ssh/) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: src/servonaut/cli/ssh.py: references a sensitive credential path (/.ssh/) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: src/servonaut/mcp/installer.py: references a sensitive credential path (/.cursor/) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: src/servonaut/screens/aws_create.py: references a sensitive credential path (/.ssh/) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: src/servonaut/screens/custom_servers.py: references a sensitive credential path (/.ssh/) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: src/servonaut/screens/help.py: references a sensitive credential path (/.ssh/) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: src/servonaut/screens/hetzner_create.py: references a sensitive credential path (/.ssh/) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: src/servonaut/screens/hetzner_setup.py: references a sensitive credential path (/.ssh/) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: src/servonaut/screens/key_management.py: references a sensitive credential path (/.ssh/) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: src/servonaut/screens/ovh_setup.py: references a sensitive credential path (/.ssh/) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: src/servonaut/screens/settings.py: references a sensitive credential path (.aws/credentials) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: src/servonaut/services/interfaces.py: references a sensitive credential path (/.ssh/) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: src/servonaut/services/object_storage_service.py: references a sensitive credential path (.aws/credentials) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: src/servonaut/services/redaction_service.py: references a sensitive credential path (/.ssh/) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: src/servonaut/services/secret_provider.py: references a sensitive credential path (/.ssh/) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: src/servonaut/services/ssh_service.py: references a sensitive credential path (/.ssh/) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: tests/conftest.py: references a sensitive credential path (/.ssh/) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: tests/test_cli_ssh.py: references a sensitive credential path (id_rsa) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: tests/test_config_schema.py: references a sensitive credential path (/.ssh/) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: tests/test_connection_service.py: references a sensitive credential path (/.ssh/) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: tests/test_custom_server_service.py: references a sensitive credential path (/.ssh/) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: tests/test_demo_mode_coverage.py: references a sensitive credential path (/.ssh/) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: tests/test_hetzner_tools.py: references a sensitive credential path (/.ssh/) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: tests/test_log_viewer_service.py: references a sensitive credential path (/.ssh/) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: tests/test_mcp_aws_tools.py: references a sensitive credential path (/.ssh/) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: tests/test_mcp_tools.py: references a sensitive credential path (/.ssh/) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: tests/test_memory_service.py: references a sensitive credential path (/.ssh/) — the tool-poisoning exfiltration target. HIGH: shell/exec capability AND network egress together — download-and-execute risk (src/servonaut/main.py: subprocess.* call; src/servonaut/mcp/remote_client.py: outbound HTTP/socket call). HIGH: shell/exec capability AND destructive filesystem writes together (src/servonaut/main.py: subprocess.* call; src/servonaut/config/manager.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.)). discloses shell/exec capability: src/servonaut/main.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/servonaut/cli/memory.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/servonaut/cli/secrets.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/servonaut/cli/servers.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/servonaut/cli/ssh.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/servonaut/screens/command_overlay.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/servonaut/screens/key_management.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/servonaut/screens/log_viewer.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/servonaut/screens/memory.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/servonaut/services/bw_resolver.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/servonaut/services/scan_service.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/servonaut/services/scp_service.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/servonaut/services/ssh_service.py: subprocess.* call with shell=True (command-injection prone) discloses shell/exec capability: src/servonaut/services/terminal_service.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/servonaut/services/update_service.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/servonaut/utils/platform_utils.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/servonaut/widgets/remote_tree.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_docs_cli_commands.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_mcp_headless_imports.py: subprocess.* call discloses dynamic code execution: tests/test_memory_cli.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: tests/test_memory_screens.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses dynamic code execution: tests/test_memory_sync_service.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/servonaut/config/manager.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/servonaut/mcp/audit.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/servonaut/mcp/tool_schemas.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/servonaut/screens/fleet_memory.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/servonaut/screens/memory.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/servonaut/screens/memory_consent_modal.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/servonaut/screens/server_actions.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/servonaut/services/api_client.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/servonaut/services/auth_service.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/servonaut/services/aws_audit.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/servonaut/services/cache_service.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/servonaut/services/command_history.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/servonaut/services/keyword_store.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/servonaut/services/ovh_audit.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/servonaut/services/ovh_audit.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/servonaut/services/secret_provider.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/servonaut/services/ssh_service.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/servonaut/services/ssh_service.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/servonaut/services/terminal_service.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/servonaut/services/memory/export_service.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/servonaut/services/memory/store.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/servonaut/services/memory/store.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/servonaut/services/memory/sync_service.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/servonaut/utils/ephemeral_key.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/servonaut/utils/relay_log.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_auth_service.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_bug_report_service.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_bw_resolver.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_cache_service.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_config_manager.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_mcp_audit.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_mcp_audit_rotation.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_memory_export_service.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_memory_findings.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_memory_store.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_memory_store.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_ssh_utils.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of dev.servonaut/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  warn10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  manifest/source references Check for updates behavior — disclosure