dev.servonaut/servonaut

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  fail25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  Python build script executes at build time: network call in build script

• Credential hygiene

  warn15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  tests/test_ai_analysis_service.py: assigns a literal to api_key ($OPE…EY (len 15)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/test_ai_analysis_service.py: assigns a literal to api_key ($ANT…EY (len 14)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/test_ai_analysis_service.py: assigns a literal to api_key (gemi…ey (len 14)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/test_ai_analysis_service.py: assigns a literal to api_key (secr…ey (len 17)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/test_ai_analysis_service.py: assigns a literal to api_key ($GEM…EY (len 15)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/test_bw_resolver.py: embeds a PRIVATE KEY block. (in an example/sample file — lower severity, but a real key here still leaks.) Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. scripts/demo_fleet.py) — the recommended intake shape.

• Permission scope

  warn15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  references credential paths: 17 files (src/servonaut/cli/hetzner.py, src/servonaut/cli/ssh.py, src/servonaut/mcp/tools.py, +14 more) has both shell/exec and network egress — capable of download-and-run, though no such path was observed (src/servonaut/main.py: subprocess.* call; src/servonaut/mcp/remote_client.py: outbound HTTP/socket call). has both shell/exec and destructive filesystem writes (src/servonaut/main.py: subprocess.* call; src/servonaut/config/manager.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.)). discloses shell/exec capability: 18 files (src/servonaut/main.py, src/servonaut/cli/memory.py, src/servonaut/cli/secrets.py, +15 more) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: 21 files (src/servonaut/config/manager.py, src/servonaut/mcp/audit.py, src/servonaut/mcp/installer.py, +18 more) Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  fail10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  vs prior 2.25.4 (minor bump): new capability primitive(s) in source: fs-write, http-client, subprocess; new hardcoded outbound host/BCC destination(s): ..., .your-objectstorage.com, api.abuseipdb.com, api.anthropic.com, api.openai.com, api.servonaut.dev, bitwarden.com, brew.sh, checkout-stripe.com, checkout.stripe.com, checkout.stripe.com.evil.example, code.visualstudio.com, console.hetzner.cloud, cursor.com, custom.endpoint.example.com, docs.aws.amazon.com, docs.hetzner.cloud, docs.hetzner.com, docs.windsurf.com, evil, evil.example, example.com, fsn1.your-objectstorage.com, generativelanguage.googleapis.com, github.com, gpu-box.example, h, help.ovhcloud.com, hostname, huggingface.co, ip-api.com, mcp.servonaut.dev, nbg1.your-objectstorage.com, ollama.com, opencode.ai, pricepertoken.com, pypi.org, raw.githubusercontent.com, s3., s3.gra.io.cloud.ovh.net, servonaut.dev, sh.rustup.rs, staging.example.com, vault.bitwarden.com, vault.example.com, www.apple.com, www.ovh.com, www.python.org.

• Transport config

  warn10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  manifest/source references Check for updates behavior — disclosure