exchange.merx/mcp

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  pass25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  Scanned 460 text field(s); no instruction-injection patterns found. PASS = no static red flag. A server can serve different tool descriptions at runtime (the rug-pull class), which static scanning cannot see.

• Supply chain

  pass25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  repository linkage verified

• Credential hygiene

  fail15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  tool "estimate_transaction_cost" has a secret-shaped input parameter "token_address" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_swap_quote" has a secret-shaped input parameter "from_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_swap_quote" has a secret-shaped input parameter "to_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "execute_swap" has a secret-shaped input parameter "from_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "execute_swap" has a secret-shaped input parameter "to_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "create_account" has a secret-shaped input parameter "password" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "login" has a secret-shaped input parameter "password" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "set_api_key" has a secret-shaped input parameter "api_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "set_private_key" has a secret-shaped input parameter "private_key" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. src/lib/api.ts) — the recommended intake shape.

• Permission scope

  pass15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  Network egress present (src/lib/api.ts: outbound HTTP/socket call) — expected for most servers and not a finding on its own. No shell-exec, unbounded/sensitive filesystem, or download-and-run primitives found in scanned source. PASS = no static red flag. Static scanning is blind to code fetched or executed at runtime.

• Version behavior

  fail10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  vs prior 1.0.4 (patch bump): new tool "get_prices" appeared; new tool "get_best_price" appeared; new tool "analyze_prices" appeared; new tool "get_price_history" appeared; new tool "compare_providers" appeared; new tool "estimate_transaction_cost" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "check_address_resources" appeared; new tool "create_order" appeared; new tool "get_order" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "list_orders" appeared; new tool "ensure_resources" appeared; new tool "wait_for_delegation" appeared; new tool "get_balance" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "get_deposit_info" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "get_transaction_history" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "explain_concept" appeared; new tool "suggest_duration" appeared; new tool "calculate_savings" appeared; new tool "list_providers" appeared; new tool "get_account_info" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "get_trx_balance" appeared; new tool "get_trc20_balance" appeared; new tool "get_transaction" appeared; new tool "get_block" appeared; new tool "get_chain_parameters" appeared; new tool "convert_address" appeared; new tool "get_trx_price" appeared; new tool "validate_address" appeared; new tool "search_transaction_history" appeared; new tool "transfer_trx" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "transfer_trc20" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "approve_trc20" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "get_token_info" appeared; new tool "read_contract" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "estimate_contract_call" appeared; new tool "call_contract" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "get_contract_info" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "get_swap_quote" appeared; new tool "execute_swap" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "get_token_price" appeared; new tool "create_account" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "login" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "set_api_key" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "set_private_key" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "deposit_trx" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "enable_auto_deposit" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "pay_invoice" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "create_paid_order" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "execute_intent" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "simulate" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "create_standing_order" appeared; new tool "list_standing_orders" appeared; new tool "get_standing_order" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "cancel_standing_order" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "create_monitor" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "list_monitors" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "cancel_monitor" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "withdraw" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "compile_policy" appeared; new tool "resource_broadcast" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "register_agent" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "request_payment" appeared; new tool "lookup_invoice" appeared; new tool "create_invoice" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "watch_address" appeared; new tool "agent_status" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new capability primitive(s) in source: http-client; new hardcoded outbound host/BCC destination(s): api.coingecko.com, api.trongrid.io, github.com, merx.exchange, tronscan.org.

• Transport config

  fail10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  remote MCP endpoint declares NO authentication (unauthenticated remote — nginx-ui/CVE-2026-33032 class)