MCP server · trust report

io.github.AceDataCloud/mcp-aichat

2 checks that ran failed — supply chain and version behavior — so this release can’t be trusted as-is.

Publisher
io.github.AceDataCloud
Repository
github.com/AceDataCloud/AiChatMCP
Install
pypi:mcp-aichat, pypi:mcp-aichat, pypi:mcp-aichat, pypi:mcp-aichat, pypi:mcp-aichat, pypi:mcp-aichat, pypi:mcp-aichat, pypi:mcp-aichat, pypi:mcp-aichat, pypi:mcp-aichat, pypi:mcp-aichat, pypi:mcp-aichat, pypi:mcp-aichat, pypi:mcp-aichat, pypi:mcp-aichat, pypi:mcp-aichat, pypi:mcp-aichat, pypi:mcp-aichat, pypi:mcp-aichat, pypi:mcp-aichat, pypi:mcp-aichat, pypi:mcp-aichat, pypi:mcp-aichat, pypi:mcp-aichat, pypi:mcp-aichat, pypi:mcp-aichat
Versions
26
Inspected
5 of 6 checks · 75%
Scored
2026-09-01 · rubric 1.0.0

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

6 checks3 clean2 flagged1 not inspected
  • Injection surface

    unscannable25% of grade

    Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

    No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

  • Supply chain

    fail25% of grade

    Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

    Python build script executes at build time: network call in build script

  • Credential hygiene

    pass15% of grade

    How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

    Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. core/config.py) — the recommended intake shape. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

  • Permission scope

    pass15% of grade

    Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

    Network egress present (core/client.py: outbound HTTP/socket call) — expected for most servers and not a finding on its own. No shell-exec, unbounded/sensitive filesystem, or download-and-run primitives found in scanned source. PASS = no static red flag. Static scanning is blind to code fetched or executed at runtime.

  • Version behavior

    fail10% of grade

    Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

    vs prior 2026.8.25.0 (patch bump): new capability primitive(s) in source: http-client; new hardcoded outbound host/BCC destination(s): api.acedata.cloud, api.test.com, auth.acedata.cloud, cdn.acedata.cloud, custom.api.com, example.com, github.com, platform.acedata.cloud.

  • Transport config

    pass10% of grade

    Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

    remote endpoint "https://aichat.mcp.acedata.cloud/mcp" uses TLS (https); remote endpoint uses OAuth (strongest auth mode)

Version history

Each release plotted by grade against the safe line at B. A version that sinks below the line has lost its trusted standing — the shape of a rug-pull.

VersionPublishedGradeScoreInspectedChange
v2026.8.31.0 · current2026-08-31 C655/6 · 75%B→C in v2026.8.31.0
v2026.8.25.02026-08-25 B755/6 · 75%±0
v2026.8.23.02026-08-23 B755/6 · 75%±0
v2026.8.22.02026-08-22 B755/6 · 75%±0
v2026.8.18.22026-08-18 B755/6 · 75%±0
v2026.8.17.02026-08-17 B754/6 · 65%±0
v2026.8.16.02026-08-16 B755/6 · 75%±0
v2026.8.10.02026-08-10 B755/6 · 75%±0
v2026.8.8.02026-08-08 B755/6 · 75%±0
v2026.8.4.12026-08-04 B755/6 · 75%±0
v2026.7.30.02026-07-30 B754/6 · 65%±0
v2026.7.28.02026-07-28 B754/6 · 65%±0
v2026.7.27.02026-07-27 B755/6 · 75%±0
v2026.7.25.02026-07-25 B755/6 · 75%±0
v2026.7.22.02026-07-22 B755/6 · 75%±0
v2026.7.20.02026-07-20 B755/6 · 75%C→B in v2026.7.20.0
v2026.7.19.02026-07-19 C655/6 · 75%B→C in v2026.7.19.0
v2026.7.4.02026-07-04 B753/6 · 55%