MCP server · trust report

io.github.AceDataCloud/mcp-hailuo

2 checks that ran failed — supply chain and version behavior — so this release can’t be trusted as-is.

Publisher
io.github.AceDataCloud
Repository
github.com/AceDataCloud/HailuoMCP
Install
pypi:mcp-hailuo, pypi:mcp-hailuo, pypi:mcp-hailuo, pypi:mcp-hailuo, pypi:mcp-hailuo, pypi:mcp-hailuo, pypi:mcp-hailuo, pypi:mcp-hailuo, pypi:mcp-hailuo, pypi:mcp-hailuo, pypi:mcp-hailuo, pypi:mcp-hailuo, pypi:mcp-hailuo, pypi:mcp-hailuo, pypi:mcp-hailuo, pypi:mcp-hailuo, pypi:mcp-hailuo, pypi:mcp-hailuo, pypi:mcp-hailuo, pypi:mcp-hailuo, pypi:mcp-hailuo, pypi:mcp-hailuo, pypi:mcp-hailuo, pypi:mcp-hailuo, pypi:mcp-hailuo, pypi:mcp-hailuo, pypi:mcp-hailuo, pypi:mcp-hailuo, pypi:mcp-hailuo, pypi:mcp-hailuo, pypi:mcp-hailuo, pypi:mcp-hailuo, pypi:mcp-hailuo, pypi:mcp-hailuo, pypi:mcp-hailuo, pypi:mcp-hailuo
Versions
36
Inspected
5 of 6 checks · 75%
Scored
2026-09-02 · rubric 1.0.0

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

6 checks2 clean3 flagged1 not inspected
  • Injection surface

    unscannable25% of grade

    Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

    No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

  • Supply chain

    fail25% of grade

    Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

    Python build script executes at build time: network call in build script

  • Credential hygiene

    pass15% of grade

    How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

    Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. core/config.py) — the recommended intake shape. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

  • Permission scope

    pass15% of grade

    Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

    Network egress present (core/client.py: outbound HTTP/socket call) — expected for most servers and not a finding on its own. No shell-exec, unbounded/sensitive filesystem, or download-and-run primitives found in scanned source. PASS = no static red flag. Static scanning is blind to code fetched or executed at runtime.

  • Version behavior

    fail10% of grade

    Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

    vs prior 2026.8.23.0 (patch bump): new capability primitive(s) in source: http-client; new hardcoded outbound host/BCC destination(s): api.acedata.cloud, api.test.com, auth.acedata.cloud, cdn.acedata.cloud, custom.api.com, example.com, github.com, platform.acedata.cloud, platform.cdn.acedata.cloud.

  • Transport config

    warn10% of grade

    Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

    manifest/source references tracking behavior — disclosure

Version history

Each release plotted by grade against the safe line at B. A version that sinks below the line has lost its trusted standing — the shape of a rug-pull.

VersionPublishedGradeScoreInspectedChange
v2026.8.28.0 · current2026-08-28 C605/6 · 75%B→C in v2026.8.28.0
v2026.8.23.02026-08-23 B755/6 · 75%±0
v2026.8.18.02026-08-18 B755/6 · 75%±0
v2026.8.17.02026-08-17 B754/6 · 65%C→B in v2026.8.17.0
v2026.8.15.02026-08-15 C705/6 · 75%B→C in v2026.8.15.0
v2026.7.30.02026-07-30 B955/6 · 75%C→B in v2026.7.30.0
v2026.7.6.02026-07-06 C704/6 · 65%±0
v2026.6.14.02026-06-14 C704/6 · 65%±0
v2026.5.25.02026-05-25 C704/6 · 65%