io.github.Alejandrehl/kainext-binance-mcp

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  warn25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  no resolvable repository linked to the package (provenance unverifiable)

• Credential hygiene

  warn15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  tests/test_audit.py: assigns a literal to API_KEY (supe…ey (len 16)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/test_executor.py: assigns a literal to api_key (LEAK…YZ (len 24)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. tests/test_tools_write.py: assigns a literal to API_KEY (READ…bc (len 17)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. tests/integration/test_capa2_marketdata.py) — the recommended intake shape.

• Permission scope

  warn15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  has both shell/exec and network egress — capable of download-and-run, though no such path was observed (src/kainext_binance_mcp_confirmer/dialog.py: subprocess.* call; src/kainext_binance_mcp/ipc.py: outbound HTTP/socket call). has both shell/exec and destructive filesystem writes (src/kainext_binance_mcp_confirmer/dialog.py: subprocess.* call; src/kainext_binance_mcp/ipc.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.)). discloses shell/exec capability: src/kainext_binance_mcp_confirmer/dialog.py: subprocess.* call discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/kainext_binance_mcp/ipc.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/kainext_binance_mcp_confirmer/audit.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of io.github.Alejandrehl/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  warn10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  manifest/source references analytics behavior — disclosure