io.github.Artexis10/exomem

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  fail25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  Python build script executes at build time: subprocess in build script, network call in build script

• Credential hygiene

  fail15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  src/exomem/governance/scrubber.py: embeds a PRIVATE KEY block. src/exomem/server_auth.py: assigns a literal to token (host…ce (len 19)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. src/exomem/__main__.py) — the recommended intake shape.

• Permission scope

  fail15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  HIGH: shell/exec capability AND network egress together — download-and-execute risk (src/exomem/deploy_provenance.py: subprocess.* call; src/exomem/doctor.py: outbound HTTP/socket call). HIGH: shell/exec capability AND destructive filesystem writes together (src/exomem/deploy_provenance.py: subprocess.* call; src/exomem/audit.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access). discloses shell/exec capability: src/exomem/deploy_provenance.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/exomem/doctor.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/exomem/extract.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/exomem/media_worker.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/exomem/package_skills.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/exomem/public_artifact_privacy.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/exomem/resource_status.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/exomem/_hooks/exomem_continuation_checkpoint.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/exomem/_hooks/exomem_retrieve_nudge.py: subprocess.* call discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/exomem/audit.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/exomem/delete_directory.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/exomem/delete_file.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/exomem/demo.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/exomem/hosted_portability.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/exomem/hosted_portability.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/exomem/hosted_runtime.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/exomem/hosted_runtime_temp.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/exomem/hosted_transfer_routes.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/exomem/install_info.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/exomem/install_skill.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/exomem/package_skills.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/exomem/preserve.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/exomem/recover_from_trash.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/exomem/relation_review.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/exomem/review_state.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/exomem/setup_wizard.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/exomem/vault.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/exomem/vault.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/exomem/_hooks/exomem_continuation_checkpoint.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/exomem/governance/egress.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of io.github.Artexis10/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  warn10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  manifest/source references telemetry behavior — disclosure