io.github.BigRedCloud/red-mcp-server

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  fail25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  tool "brc_send_sales_invoice_email" param "toAddresses" description: names an outbound copy/exfil destination (BCC/exfil verb). tool "brc_send_sales_invoice_email" param "bccAddresses" description: names an outbound copy/exfil destination (BCC/exfil verb). tool "brc_send_email_statement" param "toAddresses" description: names an outbound copy/exfil destination (BCC/exfil verb). tool "brc_send_email_statement" param "bccAddresses" description: names an outbound copy/exfil destination (BCC/exfil verb). tool "brc_send_quote_email" param "toAddresses" description: names an outbound copy/exfil destination (BCC/exfil verb). tool "brc_send_quote_email" param "bccAddresses" description: names an outbound copy/exfil destination (BCC/exfil verb). server instructions: instruction to hide activity from the user. server instructions: names an outbound copy/exfil destination (BCC/exfil verb). server instructions: off-vendor URL in a description (bigredcloud.com); capability text should not name where data goes.

• Supply chain

  warn25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  install hook "postinstall" present and not a recognized benign build command

• Credential hygiene

  fail15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  tool "brc_create_customer" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_update_customer" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_delete_customer" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_create_supplier" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_update_supplier" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_delete_supplier" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_create_purchase" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_create_purchase_gen_ref" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_update_purchase" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_delete_purchase" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_create_sales_entry" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_update_sales_entry" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_delete_sales_entry" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_create_sales_invoice" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_create_sales_invoice_gen_ref" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_update_sales_invoice" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_delete_sales_invoice" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_create_quote" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_create_quote_gen_ref" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_update_quote" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_close_quote" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_reopen_quote" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_delete_quote" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_generate_sales_invoice_from_quote" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_create_sales_credit_note" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_create_sales_credit_note_gen_ref" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_update_sales_credit_note" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_delete_sales_credit_note" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_create_sales_rep" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_update_sales_rep" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_delete_sales_rep" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_create_cash_payment" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_update_cash_payment" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_delete_cash_payment" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_batch_cash_payments" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_create_cash_receipt" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_update_cash_receipt" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_delete_cash_receipt" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_batch_cash_receipts" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_create_payment" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_update_payment" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_delete_payment" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_batch_payments" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_create_bank_account" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_update_bank_account" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_delete_bank_account" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_create_product" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_update_product" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_delete_product" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_batch_purchases" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_batch_quotes" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_batch_sales_credit_notes" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_batch_sales_entries" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_batch_sales_invoices" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_batch_sales_reps" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_batch_suppliers" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_batch_customers" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_batch_products" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_process_vat_category_rates" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_send_sales_invoice_email" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_send_email_statement" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_send_quote_email" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_update_allocations" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_delete_allocation_resolver" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_create_nominal_journal_batch" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_update_nominal_journal_batch" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_delete_nominal_journal_batch" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_create_accrual" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_update_accrual" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_delete_accrual" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_create_prepayment" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_update_prepayment" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "brc_delete_prepayment" has a secret-shaped input parameter "routeToken" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential).

• Permission scope

  pass15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  No shell-exec, unbounded/sensitive filesystem, or download-and-run primitives found in scanned source. PASS = no static red flag. Static scanning is blind to code fetched or executed at runtime.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of io.github.BigRedCloud/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  fail10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  remote MCP endpoint declares NO authentication (unauthenticated remote — nginx-ui/CVE-2026-33032 class)