io.github.DustinTrap/kvm-pilot

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  fail25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  Python build script executes at build time: network call in build script

• Credential hygiene

  pass15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. src/kvm_pilot/cli.py) — the recommended intake shape. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

• Permission scope

  fail15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  HIGH: shell/exec capability AND network egress together — download-and-execute risk (src/kvm_pilot/firmware_registry.py: subprocess.* call; src/kvm_pilot/http.py: outbound HTTP/socket call). HIGH: shell/exec capability AND destructive filesystem writes together (src/kvm_pilot/firmware_registry.py: subprocess.* call; .claude/skills/checkpoint/scan.sh: path traversal ('../') combined with file access). discloses shell/exec capability: src/kvm_pilot/firmware_registry.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: src/kvm_pilot/ssh.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/integration/conftest.py: subprocess.* call discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: .claude/skills/checkpoint/scan.sh: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: .github/scripts/build_wiki.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: .github/scripts/build_wiki.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: examples/bios_audit.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/kvm_pilot/ssh.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_maturity.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  fail10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  vs prior 0.1.0b9 (other bump): new capability primitive(s) in source: fs-write, http-client, net, subprocess; new hardcoded outbound host/BCC destination(s): 127.0.0.1, 192.168.1.1, 192.168.8.1, api.anthropic.com, bmc.lan, box, dl.gl-inet.com, docs.pikvm.org, evil.example, example.com, fake, h, raw.githubusercontent.com, srv, vendor, x.

• Transport config

  warn10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  manifest/source references Tracking behavior — disclosure