io.github.EthanQC/feishu-user-plugin

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  warn25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  tool "read_messages" param "via_user" description: cross-tool redirection ('instead of call…'). tool "send_post_as_user" param "paragraphs" description: off-vendor URL in a description (...); capability text should not name where data goes. tool "send_card_as_user" description: off-vendor URL in a description (open.feishu.cn); capability text should not name where data goes. tool "send_card_as_user" param "card" description: off-vendor URL in a description (open.feishu.cn); capability text should not name where data goes. tool "create_okr_progress_record" param "source_url" description: off-vendor URL in a description (feishu.cn); capability text should not name where data goes.

• Supply chain

  pass25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  install hook "prepare" is a recognized benign build command; repository linkage verified

• Credential hygiene

  fail15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  tool "manage_bitable_app" has a secret-shaped input parameter "app_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "manage_bitable_app" has a secret-shaped input parameter "wiki_parent_node_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "manage_bitable_table" has a secret-shaped input parameter "app_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "manage_bitable_field" has a secret-shaped input parameter "app_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "manage_bitable_view" has a secret-shaped input parameter "app_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "manage_bitable_record" has a secret-shaped input parameter "app_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "download_doc_image" has a secret-shaped input parameter "image_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "download_doc_image" has a secret-shaped input parameter "doc_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "create_doc" has a secret-shaped input parameter "wiki_parent_node_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "manage_doc_block" has a secret-shaped input parameter "image_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "manage_doc_block" has a secret-shaped input parameter "file_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "list_files" has a secret-shaped input parameter "folder_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "create_folder" has a secret-shaped input parameter "parent_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "upload_drive_file" has a secret-shaped input parameter "folder_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "upload_drive_file" has a secret-shaped input parameter "wiki_parent_node_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "manage_drive_file" has a secret-shaped input parameter "file_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "manage_drive_file" has a secret-shaped input parameter "folder_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "upload_bitable_attachment" has a secret-shaped input parameter "app_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "list_wiki_nodes" has a secret-shaped input parameter "parent_node_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "get_wiki_node" has a secret-shaped input parameter "node_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "create_wiki_node" has a secret-shaped input parameter "parent_node_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "create_wiki_node" has a secret-shaped input parameter "origin_node_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "update_wiki_node" has a secret-shaped input parameter "node_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "move_wiki_node" has a secret-shaped input parameter "node_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "move_wiki_node" has a secret-shaped input parameter "target_parent_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "copy_wiki_node" has a secret-shaped input parameter "node_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "copy_wiki_node" has a secret-shaped input parameter "target_parent_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential). tool "delete_wiki_node" has a secret-shaped input parameter "node_token" — secrets must never be tool parameters (the model would supply/handle the credential).

• Permission scope

  pass15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  No shell-exec, unbounded/sensitive filesystem, or download-and-run primitives found in scanned source. PASS = no static red flag. Static scanning is blind to code fetched or executed at runtime.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of io.github.EthanQC/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  unscannable10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  local stdio server: no remote transport or auth surface, and no phone-home/telemetry signal found in source. Absence of transport findings is NOT a safety guarantee — phone-home hosts can be constructed at runtime and defeat static analysis.