io.github.FilippoPilo/cortex

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  warn25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  server instructions: off-vendor URL in a description (skynetlab-cortex.com); capability text should not name where data goes.

• Supply chain

  pass25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  repository linkage verified

• Credential hygiene

  pass15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  No hardcoded secrets, secret-shaped tool parameters, or leaked keys found. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

• Permission scope

  unscannable15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  No source files, package.json, or pyproject were fetched; cannot infer capability scope.

• Version behavior

  fail10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  vs prior 1.0.0 (patch bump): new tool "search" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "fetch" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "cortex_recall" appeared; new tool "cortex_write" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "cortex_write_status" touches a sensitive surface (email/exec/net/fs); new tool "cortex_forget" appeared; new tool "cortex_conflicts" appeared.

• Transport config

  pass10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  remote endpoint "https://skynetlab-cortex-saas-mcp.cortex-320.workers.dev/mcp" uses TLS (https); remote endpoint uses OAuth (strongest auth mode)