io.github.IgorGanapolsky/thumbgate

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  warn25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  install hook "postinstall" present and not a recognized benign build command; install hook "prepare" present and not a recognized benign build command; dependency "@google/genai" is edit-distance 2 from popular package "openai" (typosquat candidate)

• Credential hygiene

  warn15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  .env.example: contains a hardcoded GitHub fine-grained PAT (gith…nt (len 47)) — in an example/sample file; verify it is not a real key. Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. scripts/activation-tracker.js) — the recommended intake shape.

• Permission scope

  fail15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  HIGH: executes content derived from a network response (scripts/operational-integrity.js: passes a network response into an exec/eval call). references credential paths: scripts/secret-scanner.js: references a credential path (id_rsa) references credential paths: src/api/server.js: references a credential path (/mcp.json) has both shell/exec and destructive filesystem writes (scripts/agentic-data-pipeline.js: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn; scripts/activation-tracker.js: destructive/writing fs.* call (write/unlink/rm/chmod/rename)). discloses shell/exec capability: 21 files (scripts/agentic-data-pipeline.js, scripts/async-job-runner.js, bin/cli.js, +18 more) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: 58 files (scripts/activation-tracker.js, scripts/agentic-data-pipeline.js, scripts/async-job-runner.js, +55 more) Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of io.github.IgorGanapolsky/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  fail10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  source performs runtime self-update / download-and-execute (bypasses version_behavior); sends telemetry to third-party SDK (PostHog) — disclosure, verify opt-in; manifest/source references analytics behavior — disclosure