MCP server · trust report

io.github.Juliusolsson05/workflow-mcp

Passes 3 checks with a soft flag on supply chain — worth a look, not a dealbreaker.

Publisher
io.github.Juliusolsson05
Repository
github.com/Juliusolsson05/workflow-mcp
Install
oci:docker.io/juliusolsson/workflow-mcp@sha256:30270e5bb1c52a40d12ad791f3dc865b9fa09115955efa184773adecb0e45d25, oci:docker.io/juliusolsson/workflow-mcp@sha256:39c46ce02e5be2243ff31d19aa9e37c369baa5629c20b70aca4cd7d40450c838, oci:docker.io/juliusolsson/workflow-mcp@sha256:fceac1e3c5df58856db68ea6f4255af9e4d1b5f013ac07acab0dc9898320b416, oci:docker.io/juliusolsson/workflow-mcp@sha256:48138ce62be0425dd76cb654d0c7cb3cae4b2d302b264855f6b28a2bffa8959e, oci:docker.io/juliusolsson/workflow-mcp@sha256:fe0c6028592b9286f1c777b495d58f8be15b8f98c4921b646fff86b46a84a969, oci:docker.io/juliusolsson/workflow-mcp@sha256:4b6889f9e78d0208e6d1d343ba23d0c5d092b1a1513a73c9c85deb2d00ab5855
Versions
6
Inspected
4 of 6 checks · 65%
Scored
2026-09-03 · rubric 1.0.0

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

6 checks3 clean1 flagged2 not inspected
  • Injection surface

    unscannable25% of grade

    Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

    No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

  • Supply chain

    warn25% of grade

    Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

    dependency "acorn" is edit-distance 2 from popular package "@babel/core" (typosquat candidate)

  • Credential hygiene

    pass15% of grade

    How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

    No hardcoded secrets, secret-shaped tool parameters, or leaked keys found. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

  • Permission scope

    pass15% of grade

    Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

    No shell-exec, unbounded/sensitive filesystem, or download-and-run primitives found in scanned source. PASS = no static red flag. Static scanning is blind to code fetched or executed at runtime.

  • Version behavior

    pass10% of grade

    Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

    tool surface, capabilities, install scripts, and publisher unchanged vs prior version 1.0.0 (minor bump); no rug-pull drift.

  • Transport config

    unscannable10% of grade

    Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

    local stdio server: no remote transport or auth surface, and no phone-home/telemetry signal found in source. Absence of transport findings is NOT a safety guarantee — phone-home hosts can be constructed at runtime and defeat static analysis.

Version history

Each release plotted by grade against the safe line at B. A version that sinks below the line has lost its trusted standing — the shape of a rug-pull.

VersionPublishedGradeScoreInspectedChange
v1.1.0 · current2026-07-27 B87.54/6 · 65%±0
v1.0.02026-07-27 B87.53/6 · 55%±0
v0.1.52026-07-26 B87.54/6 · 65%±0
v0.1.32026-07-23 B87.53/6 · 55%