MCP server · trust report

io.github.KyaniteLabs/kinocut

2 checks that ran failed — supply chain and version behavior — so this release can’t be trusted as-is.

Publisher
io.github.KyaniteLabs
Repository
github.com/KyaniteLabs/kinocut
Install
pypi:kinocut, pypi:kinocut, pypi:kinocut, pypi:kinocut, pypi:kinocut, pypi:kinocut, pypi:kinocut, pypi:kinocut, pypi:kinocut, pypi:kinocut, pypi:kinocut, pypi:kinocut, pypi:kinocut, pypi:kinocut, pypi:kinocut
Versions
15
Inspected
5 of 6 checks · 75%
Scored
2026-09-04 · rubric 1.0.0

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

6 checks1 clean4 flagged1 not inspected
  • Injection surface

    unscannable25% of grade

    Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

    No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

  • Supply chain

    fail25% of grade

    Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

    Python build script executes at build time: subprocess in build script

  • Credential hygiene

    pass15% of grade

    How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

    Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. kinocut/doctor.py) — the recommended intake shape. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

  • Permission scope

    warn15% of grade

    Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

    has both shell/exec and network egress — capable of download-and-run, though no such path was observed (kinocut/design_guardrails.py: subprocess.* call; kinocut/font_manager.py: outbound HTTP/socket call). has both shell/exec and destructive filesystem writes (kinocut/design_guardrails.py: subprocess.* call; kinocut/engine_advanced_mask.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.)). discloses shell/exec capability: 20 files (kinocut/design_guardrails.py, kinocut/doctor.py, kinocut/engine_audio_waveform.py, +17 more) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: 27 files (kinocut/engine_advanced_mask.py, kinocut/engine_convert.py, kinocut/engine_hls.py, +24 more) Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

  • Version behavior

    fail10% of grade

    Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

    vs prior 1.15.0 (patch bump): new capability primitive(s) in source: fs-write, subprocess; new hardcoded outbound host/BCC destination(s): example.com, ffmpeg.org, git.kyanitelabs.tech, github.com, kinocut.dev, nodejs.org, raw.githubusercontent.com.

  • Transport config

    warn10% of grade

    Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

    sends telemetry to third-party SDK (amplitude) — disclosure, verify opt-in; manifest/source references Tracking behavior — disclosure

Version history

Each release plotted by grade against the safe line at B. A version that sinks below the line has lost its trusted standing — the shape of a rug-pull.

VersionPublishedGradeScoreInspectedChange
v1.15.1 · current2026-08-31 D52.55/6 · 75%B→D in v1.15.1
v1.15.02026-08-19 B754/6 · 65%±0
v1.14.12026-08-13 B753/6 · 55%D→B in v1.14.1
v1.13.42026-08-12 D52.55/6 · 75%C→D in v1.13.4
v1.13.22026-08-09 C62.55/6 · 75%D→C in v1.13.2
v1.13.12026-08-07 D57.55/6 · 75%C→D in v1.13.1
v1.11.12026-07-24 C62.54/6 · 65%±0
v1.9.02026-07-15 C62.54/6 · 65%