io.github.KyaniteLabs/mcp-video

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  pass25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  repository linkage verified

• Credential hygiene

  pass15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. mcp_video/analytics.py) — the recommended intake shape. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

• Permission scope

  fail15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  HIGH: shell/exec capability AND network egress together — download-and-execute risk (mcp_video/doctor.py: subprocess.* call; mcp_video/analytics.py: outbound HTTP/socket call). HIGH: shell/exec capability AND destructive filesystem writes together (mcp_video/doctor.py: subprocess.* call; mcp_video/analytics.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access). discloses shell/exec capability: mcp_video/doctor.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: mcp_video/engine_audio_waveform.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: mcp_video/engine_compare_quality.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: mcp_video/engine_detect_scenes.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: mcp_video/engine_runtime_utils.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: mcp_video/engine_stabilize.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: mcp_video/ffmpeg_helpers.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: mcp_video/hyperframes_engine.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: mcp_video/quality_guardrails.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: mcp_video/ai_engine/color.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: mcp_video/ai_engine/scene.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: mcp_video/ai_engine/silence.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: mcp_video/ai_engine/spatial.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: mcp_video/ai_engine/stem.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: mcp_video/ai_engine/transcribe.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: mcp_video/audio_engine/__init__.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: mcp_video/design_quality/guardrails/analysis.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: mcp_video/design_quality/guardrails/fixes.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: mcp_video/design_quality/guardrails/probe.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: mcp_video/design_quality/guardrails/scoring.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: mcp_video/effects_engine/utility.py: subprocess.* call discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: mcp_video/analytics.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: mcp_video/engine_advanced_mask.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: mcp_video/engine_convert.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: mcp_video/engine_hls.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: mcp_video/engine_images.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: mcp_video/engine_images.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: mcp_video/engine_merge.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: mcp_video/engine_merge.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: mcp_video/engine_runtime_utils.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: mcp_video/engine_stabilize.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: mcp_video/engine_timeline.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: mcp_video/server_tools_advanced.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: mcp_video/ai_engine/__init__.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: mcp_video/ai_engine/download.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: mcp_video/ai_engine/download.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: mcp_video/ai_engine/silence.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: mcp_video/ai_engine/spatial.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: mcp_video/ai_engine/upscale.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: mcp_video/audio_engine/core.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: mcp_video/client/base.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: mcp_video/design_quality/guardrails/analysis.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: mcp_video/design_quality/guardrails/scoring.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: mcp_video/effects_engine/text.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of io.github.KyaniteLabs/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  warn10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  sends telemetry to third-party SDK (Amplitude) — disclosure, verify opt-in; manifest/source references analytics behavior — disclosure