io.github.MikeyPetrillo/agent402

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  warn25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  tool "catalog.search" description: off-vendor URL in a description (agent402.tools); capability text should not name where data goes. tool "demand.request" description: off-vendor URL in a description (agent402.tools); capability text should not name where data goes. server instructions: off-vendor URL in a description (agent402.tools); capability text should not name where data goes.

• Supply chain

  warn25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  dependency "viem" is edit-distance 2 from top-20 package "vue" (typosquat candidate); dependency "@x402/evm" is edit-distance 2 from popular package "ejs" (typosquat candidate); dependency "@x402/svm" is edit-distance 2 from popular package "@anthropic-ai/sdk" (typosquat candidate); dependency "@x402/core" is edit-distance 1 from popular package "cors" (typosquat candidate); dependency "@solana/kit" is edit-distance 2 from popular package "vite" (typosquat candidate)

• Credential hygiene

  pass15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. index.js) — the recommended intake shape. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

• Permission scope

  pass15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  Network egress present (index.js: outbound HTTP/socket call) — expected for most servers and not a finding on its own. No shell-exec, unbounded/sensitive filesystem, or download-and-run primitives found in scanned source. PASS = no static red flag. Static scanning is blind to code fetched or executed at runtime.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of io.github.MikeyPetrillo/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  fail10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  remote MCP endpoint declares NO authentication (unauthenticated remote — nginx-ui/CVE-2026-33032 class); sends telemetry to third-party SDK (posthog) — disclosure, verify opt-in