io.github.OpenHCSDev/openhcs

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  fail25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  Python build script executes at build time: network call in build script

• Credential hygiene

  pass15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. openhcs/agent/path_policy.py) — the recommended intake shape. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

• Permission scope

  warn15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  references credential paths: openhcs/mcp/client_registration.py: references a credential path (/mcp.json) has both shell/exec and network egress — capable of download-and-run, though no such path was observed (openhcs/build_utils/zeroc_ice_installer.py: subprocess.* call; openhcs/build_utils/zeroc_ice_installer.py: outbound HTTP/socket call). has both shell/exec and destructive filesystem writes (openhcs/build_utils/zeroc_ice_installer.py: subprocess.* call; setup.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.)). discloses shell/exec capability: openhcs/build_utils/zeroc_ice_installer.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: openhcs/desktop_deployment.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: openhcs/gui_startup.py: subprocess.* call discloses dynamic code execution: 4 files (openhcs/core/config_document.py, openhcs/core/function_step_document.py, openhcs/core/pipeline_document.py, +1 more) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: 9 files (setup.py, openhcs/core/path_cache.py, openhcs/core/pipeline/compiler.py, +6 more) Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  fail10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  vs prior 0.8.0 (patch bump): new capability primitive(s) in source: child_process, fs-write, subprocess; new hardcoded outbound host/BCC destination(s): astral.sh, downloads.openmicroscopy.org, github.com, openhcs.readthedocs.io, openhcsdev.github.io, www.glencoesoftware.com, www.perkinelmer.com, www.w3.org.

• Transport config

  warn10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  manifest/source references Check for Updates behavior — disclosure