io.github.PRDicta/solitaire

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  pass25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  repository linkage verified

• Credential hygiene

  pass15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. solitaire/cli/__init__.py) — the recommended intake shape. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

• Permission scope

  fail15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  HIGH: shell/exec capability AND destructive filesystem writes together (solitaire/core/shared_knowledge.py: subprocess.* call; solitaire/cli/__init__.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access). discloses shell/exec capability: solitaire/core/shared_knowledge.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: solitaire/core/update_checker.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: solitaire/storage/schema.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_updater.py: subprocess.* call discloses dynamic code execution: solitaire/cli/__init__.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: solitaire/cli/__init__.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: solitaire/cli/core.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: solitaire/core/onboarding_flow.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: solitaire/core/onboarding_flow.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: solitaire/core/pushback.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: solitaire/core/session_residue.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: solitaire/engine.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: solitaire/outbound/marker.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: solitaire/platform_utils.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: solitaire/storage/backup.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: solitaire/storage/jsonl_store.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_smart_capture.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_smart_capture.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_symbiosis.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_symbiosis.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_updater.py: destructive filesystem call (shutil.rmtree/os.remove/etc.) Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of io.github.PRDicta/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  fail10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  source performs runtime self-update / download-and-execute (bypasses version_behavior); sends telemetry to third-party SDK (datadog) — disclosure, verify opt-in; manifest/source references analytics behavior — disclosure