io.github.ProvarTesting/provar

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  warn25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  dependency "@oclif/core" is edit-distance 1 from popular package "cors" (typosquat candidate); dependency "@salesforce/kit" is edit-distance 2 from popular package "vite" (typosquat candidate); dependency "@salesforce/core" is edit-distance 1 from popular package "cors" (typosquat candidate)

• Credential hygiene

  pass15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. lib/mcp/licensing/algasClient.js) — the recommended intake shape. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

• Permission scope

  warn15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  has both shell/exec and network egress — capable of download-and-run, though no such path was observed (lib/services/auth/loginFlow.js: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn; lib/mcp/licensing/algasClient.js: outbound HTTP/socket call). has both shell/exec and destructive filesystem writes (lib/services/auth/loginFlow.js: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn; lib/mcp/tools/antTools.js: destructive/writing fs.* call (write/unlink/rm/chmod/rename)). discloses shell/exec capability: lib/services/auth/loginFlow.js: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn discloses shell/exec capability: lib/mcp/tools/sfSpawn.js: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn discloses shell/exec capability: lib/mcp/update/updateChecker.js: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: 10 files (lib/mcp/tools/antTools.js, lib/services/auth/credentials.js, lib/mcp/tools/nitroXTools.js, +7 more) Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of io.github.ProvarTesting/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  fail10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  source performs runtime self-update / download-and-execute (bypasses version_behavior); manifest/source references tracking behavior — disclosure