MCP server · trust report

io.github.Pseudogiant-xr/pseudolife-mcp

2 checks that ran failed — permission scope and version behavior — so this release can’t be trusted as-is.

Publisher
io.github.Pseudogiant-xr
Repository
github.com/Pseudogiant-xr/Pseudolife-MCP
Install
pypi:pseudolife-mcp, pypi:pseudolife-mcp, pypi:pseudolife-mcp, pypi:pseudolife-mcp
Versions
4
Inspected
5 of 6 checks · 75%
Scored
2026-07-20 · rubric 1.0.0

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

6 checks2 clean3 flagged1 not inspected
  • Injection surface

    unscannable25% of grade

    Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

    No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

  • Supply chain

    pass25% of grade

    Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

    Python build script has no build-time network/exec; repository linkage verified

  • Credential hygiene

    pass15% of grade

    How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

    Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. pseudolife_memory/briefing_cli.py) — the recommended intake shape. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

  • Permission scope

    fail15% of grade

    Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

    HIGH: shell/exec capability AND network egress together — download-and-execute risk (pseudolife_memory/shim.py: subprocess.* call; pseudolife_memory/briefing_cli.py: outbound HTTP/socket call). HIGH: shell/exec capability AND destructive filesystem writes together (pseudolife_memory/shim.py: subprocess.* call; pseudolife_memory/web/static/js/views/console.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access). discloses shell/exec capability: pseudolife_memory/shim.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_daemon_http.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_eval_replicate.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_ops_backup_mirror.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_ops_prune_rollbacks.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_release_ux.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_shim.py: subprocess.* call discloses shell/exec capability: tests/test_writer_keying.py: subprocess.* call discloses dynamic code execution: tests/test_deep_dream.py: uses eval/exec/__import__ discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: pseudolife_memory/web/static/js/views/console.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: pseudolife_memory/web/static/js/views/cortex.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: pseudolife_memory/web/static/js/views/episodes.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: pseudolife_memory/web/static/js/views/graph.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: pseudolife_memory/web/static/js/views/insight.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: pseudolife_memory/web/static/js/views/observatory.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: pseudolife_memory/web/static/js/views/recall.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: pseudolife_memory/web/static/js/views/stream.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: pseudolife_memory/web/static/js/views/wiki_page.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: tests/test_web.py: path traversal ('../') combined with file access Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

  • Version behavior

    fail10% of grade

    Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

    vs prior 0.9.0 (minor bump): new hardcoded outbound host/BCC destination(s): example.test.

  • Transport config

    warn10% of grade

    Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

    manifest/source references telemetry behavior — disclosure

Version history

Each release plotted by grade against the safe line at B. A version that sinks below the line has lost its trusted standing — the shape of a rug-pull.

VersionPublishedGradeScoreInspectedChange
v0.10.0 · current2026-07-20 C705/6 · 75%±0
v0.9.02026-07-19 C705/6 · 75%B→C in v0.9.0
v0.8.12026-07-16 B1003/6 · 55%