io.github.Q00/ouroboros

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  pass25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  Python build script has no build-time network/exec; repository linkage verified

• Credential hygiene

  warn15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  src/ouroboros/config/models.py: assigns a literal to api_key (YOUR…EY (len 23)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. src/ouroboros/config/models.py: assigns a literal to api_key (YOUR…EY (len 19)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. src/ouroboros/config/models.py: assigns a literal to api_key (YOUR…EY (len 22)) — non-provider secret literal; prefer environment intake. Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. scripts/check-auto-perf-budget.py) — the recommended intake shape.

• Permission scope

  fail15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  HIGH: downloads and pipes straight to a shell (src/ouroboros/cli/commands/setup.py: pipes a download into a shell). references credential paths: src/ouroboros/cli/commands/uninstall.py: references a credential path (/mcp.json) references credential paths: src/ouroboros/evaluation/artifact_collector.py: references a credential path (id_rsa) installer script pipes a download into a shell — conventional, but worth reading before running (scripts/install.sh: pipes a download into a shell). has both shell/exec and destructive filesystem writes (scripts/check-auto-perf-budget.py: subprocess.* call; scripts/version-check.py: open(…, 'w'/'a'/'x') write-mode file access). discloses shell/exec capability: 25 files (scripts/check-auto-perf-budget.py, scripts/check-module-size.py, scripts/ralph-rewind.py, +22 more) discloses dynamic code execution: src/ouroboros/mcp/server/security.py: uses eval()/exec() discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: 17 files (scripts/version-check.py, src/ouroboros/cli/runtime_activation.py, src/ouroboros/cli/commands/config.py, +14 more) Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of io.github.Q00/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  fail10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  source performs runtime self-update / download-and-execute (bypasses version_behavior); sends telemetry to third-party SDK (PostHog) — disclosure, verify opt-in; manifest/source references tracking behavior — disclosure