io.github.RepoAssay/repo-test-architect

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  pass25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  repository linkage verified

• Credential hygiene

  pass15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  No hardcoded secrets, secret-shaped tool parameters, or leaked keys found. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

• Permission scope

  fail15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  HIGH: shell/exec capability AND network egress together — download-and-execute risk (scripts/check-bin-entrypoints.js: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn; examples/node-mocha-commonjs/lib/catalogClient.cjs: outbound HTTP/socket call). HIGH: shell/exec capability AND destructive filesystem writes together (scripts/check-bin-entrypoints.js: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn; src/adapters/kotlin/audit.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access). discloses shell/exec capability: scripts/check-bin-entrypoints.js: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn discloses shell/exec capability: scripts/check-installed-package.js: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn discloses shell/exec capability: scripts/check-mcp-stdio-smoke.js: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn discloses shell/exec capability: scripts/check-pack-contents.js: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn discloses shell/exec capability: src/diagnostics/diagnostics.js: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn discloses shell/exec capability: scripts/find-validation-repos.js: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn discloses shell/exec capability: src/cli/index.js: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn discloses shell/exec capability: scripts/support/npm-runner.js: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn discloses shell/exec capability: scripts/run-tests.js: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/adapters/kotlin/audit.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: scripts/check-distribution-readiness.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: scripts/check-golden-snapshots.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: scripts/check-installed-package.js: destructive/writing fs.* call (write/unlink/rm/chmod/rename) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: scripts/check-model-consistency-scenarios.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: scripts/collect-model-consistency-stats.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: scripts/compare-model-consistency-summaries.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/diagnostics/diagnostics.js: destructive/writing fs.* call (write/unlink/rm/chmod/rename) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/cli/index.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/core/model-consistency-runner.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: examples/node-mocha-commonjs/test/price-parser.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/mcp/tool-definitions.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: scripts/update-golden-snapshots.js: destructive/writing fs.* call (write/unlink/rm/chmod/rename) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: scripts/update-golden-snapshots.js: path traversal ('../') combined with file access discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: src/adapters/javascript/audit.ts: path traversal ('../') combined with file access Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of io.github.RepoAssay/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  unscannable10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  local stdio server: no remote transport or auth surface, and no phone-home/telemetry signal found in source. Absence of transport findings is NOT a safety guarantee — phone-home hosts can be constructed at runtime and defeat static analysis.