io.github.SAP-samples/hana-cli

What we checked

Six static checks, weighted by risk. Every result reflects only what could be observed in the published package and repository — never intent.

• Injection surface

  unscannable25% of grade

  Tool descriptions/manifest scanned for instruction-injection patterns (imperatives at the model, hidden text, 'ignore previous', data-exfil URLs).

  No tool descriptions, server instructions, prompts, or resources were fetched; nothing to scan for injection.

• Supply chain

  warn25% of grade

  Package provenance: namespace verification, repo linkage, maintainer count, account age, postinstall scripts, typosquat distance.

  install hook "postinstall" present and not a recognized benign build command; dependency "hdb" is edit-distance 2 from popular package "@anthropic-ai/sdk" (typosquat candidate); dependency "open" is edit-distance 2 from popular package "boxen" (typosquat candidate); dependency "rxjs" is edit-distance 2 from popular package "ejs" (typosquat candidate); dependency "@sap/cds" is edit-distance 2 from popular package "ws" (typosquat candidate); dependency "@json2csv/node" is edit-distance 2 from popular package "@babel/core" (typosquat candidate)

• Credential hygiene

  pass15% of grade

  How the server takes secrets (env vs plaintext config vs hardcoded); secrets appearing in tool schemas.

  Reads secrets from the environment (e.g. package.json) — the recommended intake shape. PASS = no static red flag; static analysis cannot prove the code honors env-based secret handling at runtime.

• Permission scope

  warn15% of grade

  Declared tools vs. breadth (filesystem, network, exec); flags shell-exec and unbounded filesystem access.

  has both shell/exec and network egress — capable of download-and-run, though no such path was observed (utils/base.js: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn; app/resources/tables/controller/App.controller.js: outbound HTTP/socket call). has both shell/exec and destructive filesystem writes (utils/base.js: imports child_process and calls exec/spawn; fix-require-cjs.cjs: destructive/writing fs.* call (write/unlink/rm/chmod/rename)). discloses shell/exec capability: 13 files (utils/base.js, utils/btp.js, utils/cf.js, +10 more) discloses broad/destructive filesystem access: 33 files (fix-require-cjs.cjs, generate-all-anchors.cjs, add-epilogue-final.js, +30 more) Capability DISCLOSURE, not a verdict: static analysis sees the primitive is present and reachable, not whether its use is attacker-controlled.

• Version behavior

  unscannable10% of grade

  Diff of tool definitions between versions; new permissions or changed descriptions in a patch release (the postmark-mcp class).

  no prior version to diff (first sight of io.github.SAP-samples/[email protected]); version-drift / rug-pull cannot be evaluated. Cold-start risk is covered by point-in-time checks (injection_surface, supply_chain, credential_hygiene), not here.

• Transport config

  warn10% of grade

  Remote servers: TLS and auth mode (none/token/OAuth). Local servers: whether the manifest indicates it phones home.

  manifest/source references telemetry behavior — disclosure